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1013 
RELATIONAL PREFERENCES 
IN CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS 
BROOK E. GOTBERG 
It is no secret that creditors hate so-called “preference” actions, which 
permit a debtor to recover payments made to creditors on the eve of 
bankruptcy for the benefit of the estate. Nominally, preference actions are 
intended to equalize the extent to which each unsecured creditor must bear 
the loss of a bankruptcy discharge, or to discourage creditors from rushing to 
collect from the debtor in such a way that will push an insolvent debtor into 
bankruptcy. But empirical evidence strongly suggests that, at least in chapter 
11 reorganization proceedings, preference actions do not fulfill either of 
these stated goals. Interviews with debtors, trade creditors, and attorneys 
involved in small- and medium-sized chapter 11 bankruptcy cases establish 
both that creditors are not deterred from collecting by preference actions, and 
that preference actions are not applied equally in a system where debtors are 
able to choose which preferential transfers to avoid and how much to accept 
in settlement of preference actions. Instead, these interviews suggest an 
alternative justification for preference law in chapter 11, one more consistent 
with promoting a debtor’s ability to exercise strategic leverage over its 
creditors in an effort to reorganize. In this way, the law of preference 
avoidance is actually one of preference perpetuation, and is exercised with 
an eye towards preserving valuable relationships within bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
Introduction 
In most bankruptcy proceedings, creditors correctly anticipate that the 
debtor will prove unable to repay all its debts in full, requiring unsecured 
creditors to write off most, if not all, of what they are owed. In common 
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parlance, bankruptcy is synonymous with nonpayment of debt, and 
unsecured creditors are usually the last to be paid pursuant to existing 
schemes of priority.1 Accordingly, the loss comes as no surprise. However, 
creditors are frequently surprised to learn that in chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings the debtor can demand the return of payments it has made to 
creditors in the ninety days prior to bankruptcy; these payments are generally 
referred to as “preferential transfers,” and the debtor can recover the 
“preference” from the creditor.2  
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a preferential transfer as one 
made to or on behalf of a creditor for a pre-existing debt in the ninety days 
before the bankruptcy filing,3 so long as the transfer afforded the creditor 
more than it would have received under a chapter 7 distribution.4 When a 
creditor receives notice of a preference action, it must return the amount it 
received during the preference period or present a defense establishing that 
the transfer falls within one of the exceptions delineated in the statute.5 If the 
creditor fails to present a defense, any claims it may have against the debtor’s 
estate will be disallowed,6 and a judgment may be entered against the creditor 
in the amount of the avoided preference. 
While common, preference actions are not well understood among the 
creditor population, particularly those experiencing their first bankruptcy.7 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2018). 
 2. After being sued to return fees paid, one creditor reflected, “Well, I don’t know what 
it’s called . . . I certainly have no preference for it at all.” See Telephone Interview with PC 
(Sept. 7, 2017). Each interview cited or referenced in this Article has been stripped of 
identifying information and is on file with the author. See discussion infra notes 107-215. 
 3. This ninety-day period is termed the “preference” period. 11 U.S.C. § 547. 
 4. Id. If the creditor is unsecured, and the bankruptcy payout in chapter 7 for unsecured 
creditors would be less than one hundred cents on the dollar, this requirement is always met. 
See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 713, 736-37 (1985). Preference actions are also available under other sections of the 
Code, but the ramifications of preference in consumer bankruptcies or in liquidations are not 
discussed here. 
 5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 550. These exceptions include transfers that constitute 
substantially contemporaneous exchanges, payments in the ordinary course of business, the 
granting of a purchase money security interest, and transfers that are followed by the giving 
of new value to the debtor. See Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business 
Bankruptcy: The Need for Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 67-77 
(2014).  
 6. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d). 
 7. See Erwin I. Katz et al., Types of Bankruptcy-Related Disputes, in ABI GUIDE TO 
BANKRUPTCY MEDIATION 11 (1st ed. 2005) (“Preference actions seem particularly unfair: 
creditors are often shocked to learn that they may have to repay money to a debtor for receiving 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/3
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According to the legislative history, preference actions are permitted for two 
primary reasons: first, to promote equal distribution among creditors, and 
second, to discourage creditors from rushing to collect from an insolvent 
debtor, thereby pushing the debtor into bankruptcy.8 Although both of these 
goals would nominally benefit unsecured creditors by helping to avoid 
unnecessary bankruptcies and by ensuring equal treatment among creditors 
within bankruptcy, preference actions remain a source of considerable vitriol 
among the creditor community.9 Certainly, much of this distaste can be 
explained by the psychological concept of loss aversion.10 However, an 
informed understanding of how preference actions are used in practice 
                                                                                                                 
payment that was lawful at the time but has become actionable upon the filing of 
bankruptcy.”); see infra note 188 and accompanying text.  
 8. See H. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977) (“The purpose of the preference section is 
two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a 
short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to 
dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy. . . . Second, and more important, the 
preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among 
creditors of the debtor.”); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 98 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5874 (noting the general policy of preference law is deterring “unusual action” by the 
debtor or creditors); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 202 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT 
ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS] (listing “three distinct goals” for preference in the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898) (“First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for advantage; second, 
it promotes equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to 
obtain a preferential payment or security.”); Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an 
Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 1439, 1447, 1479; Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant 
Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3 (1986); Richard 
B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 184 
(1979). 
 9. See Charles J. Tabb, The Brave New World of Bankruptcy Preferences, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 439 (2005) (“[U]nless one’s ox got gored more than average, 
economic rationality might argue for accepting a pro-trustee venue system. That economic 
argument, though, is utterly unpersuasive to trade creditors—a truth to which I personally can 
attest as Reporter for the ABI Preference Study, where I tried in vain to make that argument 
to the trade creditor representatives.”); David Lander, A Snapshot of Recent Avoidance Cases, 
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 2004, 2004 NO. 2 NRTN-BLA 2 (Westlaw) (suggesting 
that defendants in preference actions are often dubious that the net total of preference 
recoveries significantly increases distribution to unsecured creditors).  
 10. Loosely defined, loss aversion refers to the phenomenon that the pain of loss is felt 
more keenly than the benefit of gain. See Sabrina M. Tom, Craig R. Fox, Christopher Trepel 
& Russell A Poldrack, The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making Under Risk, 
SCIENCE, Jan. 2007, at 515, 515. 
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demonstrates that the distaste may also be justified by the simple fact that 
preferences are unequally enforced in chapter 11. 
Chapter 11 reorganization is complex, unlike the relatively straight-
forward liquidation proceedings available in chapter 7. Consequently, there 
is more room for unequal treatment among creditors. Under chapter 7, the 
pro rata distribution of assets among similarly situated creditors11 is overseen 
by an appointed trustee who has been vetted by the U.S. Trustee’s Office for 
potential conflicts of interest.12 In chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor, acting 
as a debtor-in-possession (DIP), proposes a plan to repay creditors.13 This 
plan can and often does depart from the formulaic distribution set forth in 
chapter 7. The chapter 11 structure has been described as “a deal within a 
lawsuit”:14 the DIP must negotiate with creditors in order to obtain sufficient 
votes for a plan of reorganization that will also satisfy the court.15 The 
creditors are undeniably invested in the debtor’s survival, but their interests 
may also be fundamentally in conflict with those of the debtor and other 
effected parties. Litigation is expected and common,16 reflecting both the 
creditors’ interests in forcing the debtor to provide them more favorable 
payment terms and the debtor’s interest in forcing creditors to be satisfied 
with less. 
Beyond the need for creditor support for the plan, a DIP, unlike a chapter 
7 trustee, will also be concerned with the ongoing viability of the company. 
Viability will be influenced by the willingness of trade partners to continue 
doing business with a debtor. When trade partners are owed money in the 
bankruptcy, they are referred to as trade creditors. Some trade creditors may 
prove essential to the debtor’s ongoing viability, and will accordingly 
warrant different treatment than other, less essential creditors. 
Consider the following generic example. Debtor Daniels runs a molded 
fiber company, which uses recycled paper pulp to manufacture packaging 
material. In order to run his day-to-day operations, he requires working 
capital, which is provided by his lender, Green Bank. Green Bank holds a 
security interest in Daniels’ inventory and equipment. By virtue of its 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2018).  
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 701; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR 
CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 2-7 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/handbook_for_chapter_ 
7_trustees.pdf/download.  
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2018). 
 14. Credit to Judge Dennis Dow, Western District of Missouri.  
 15. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  
 16. For an explanation of contested matters in bankruptcy, see Paul P. Daley & George 
W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 409 (2005).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/3
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security interest, Green Bank is entitled either to payment in full or to 
possession of its collateral. This right is preserved in bankruptcy.17 
Accordingly, Daniels must pay Green Bank or be shut down. In addition, 
Daniels owes money to Owen’s Ovens pursuant to a maintenance and parts 
agreement. Owen’s Ovens is the only local company with the ability to 
maintain the ovens Daniels needs to manufacture his products. Daniels also 
owes money to Patty’s Paper Pulp, which provides him with the raw 
materials he needs for his packaging material. However, unlike the oven 
maintenance, paper pulp is available from a variety of local vendors. In 
bankruptcy, Daniels will be most concerned about obtaining Green Bank’s 
cooperation, but also highly aware of his need to mollify Owen’s Ovens, even 
if doing so is at the expense of Patty’s Paper Pulp, with whom he has a more 
expendable business relationship. 
Consequently, Patty is likely to be treated differently in the bankruptcy 
than Owen, even though both are unsecured creditors, nominally subject to a 
pro rata distribution. Empirical evidence pulled from interviews with parties 
who have been involved in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings suggests that 
this unequal treatment extends to preference actions; the creditors who are 
sued for a preference by a DIP tend to be those who are less important to the 
debtor or less essential to the debtor’s reorganization.18 Conversely, a debtor 
generally avoids filing lawsuits against parties with whom it intends to 
preserve a long-term relationship. 
Notions of equality simply do not come into play when a DIP is fighting 
for its survival. A DIP is not technically required to bring an available 
preference action, although the debtor’s flexibility in this regard is highly 
debated.19 The applicable language in § 547 indicates that the DIP “may” 
bring the preference action, signifying a permissive standard.20 Some have 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). For a discussion regarding the extent of a secured creditor’s 
rights in bankruptcy, see Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing 
and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018) (arguing for a distinction 
between claims to priority and claims to residual value); Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit 
and Effective Entity Priority, 51 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that secured 
creditors can effectively establish priority over the entity).  
 18. See discussion infra notes 190-93.  
 19. See discussion infra notes 194-98. 
 20. The language of section 547 also applies to a chapter 7 trustee. However, unlike a 
DIP in chapter 11, a chapter 7 trustee is unlikely to refrain from pursuing a preference action 
unless doing so would be a losing strategy pursuant to a cost benefit analysis. Chapter 7 
trustees are totally unconcerned with the preservation of ongoing business relationships in 
light of liquidation, and are compensated pursuant to the amount they bring into the estate. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 326; Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“Now, Chapter 7 is 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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argued that the DIP’s fiduciary duty to the estate would require bringing any 
such existing claim, while others have argued that the language of the statute 
is deliberate, and the DIP can use its discretion in determining when a 
preference action would be detrimental to the chances of reorganization.21 
The DIP’s fiduciary duty to maximize the estate certainly suggests a duty 
to maximize preference recoveries pursuant to a cost-benefit analysis, 
although there is no clear direction on how costs and benefits should be 
measured.22 Without the cooperation of certain preferred creditors, it is 
possible that the long-term health of the company will suffer and the 
repayment of creditors will be diminished, accordingly it may be better for 
the debtor to forgo recovery, or to offer a generous settlement agreement. 23 
The debtor may also wish to settle rather than pursue a claim that appears 
more difficult, but not impossible, to prove. Indeed, settlement of preference 
claims is the rule, rather than the exception,24 but there appears to be 
relatively little oversight of preference settlements. Settlement amounts are 
not typically reported in the case docket, and a DIP need not commit itself to 
                                                                                                                 
completely different because the trustees will just immediately do it. They’ll do it for a $150 
preference, they’ll send the letter.”); Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (“I would 
say in my experience the trade creditors are being pursued by the Chapter 7 trustee, the 
liquidating trust trustee coming out of the bankruptcy so that there isn’t an ongoing Chapter 
11 debtor that needs the relationship . . . .”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) 
(“When things meltdown, preferences are always on the table. . . .[in] a 7[] or a liquidating 
11.”).  
 21. See discussion infra notes 190-96. Requiring a DIP to bring a preference action any 
time it existed would result in a significantly different dynamic in chapter 11. Whether or not 
it would be advisable to do so in order to further the equality purposes of preferences is an 
intriguing issue not examined in this paper. I have elsewhere argued that, in chapter 7, 
preference liability should be automatic and absolute, without exceptions. Gotberg, supra note 
5, at 90.   
 22. This fiduciary duty arises as a matter of law. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., 
200 F.3d 170, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (“United Healthcare, as a debtor-in-possession, is 
a fiduciary for its estate and for its creditors.”); In re J.T.R. Corp., 958 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 
1992) (“The debtor-in-possession does not act in his own interests, but rather in the interests 
of the creditors.”); Dunes Hotel Assocs. v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492, 506 (D.S.C. 2000) (“A 
trustee or debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary that should act in the interests of the creditors, 
not in its own interests.”); In re Brent Expls., Inc., 31 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1983) (“[A]t the filing of the bankruptcy petition the debtor becomes a new entity, the debtor-
in-possession with its own rights and duties. . . . This second entity has a fiduciary duty to 
the estate.”).  
 23. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (noting the ability of a DIP to reach 
a favorable settlement with important creditors when forced to bring such an action under 
pressure from the court or other creditors).  
 24. See discussion infra notes 230-32.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/3
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pursue preference claims in the plan documents provided to creditors.25 
Following plan confirmation, a DIP is not required to bring available 
preference actions, which may be settled or even abandoned.26 Accordingly, 
a broad reading of the “may” clause in  
§ 547, combined with a great deal of flexibility in establishing settlement 
amounts, allows a DIP to favor some creditors over others using preference 
actions. 
This Article makes the case that, by virtue of a debtor’s flexibility to 
pursue actions against some creditors but not others, preference avoidance 
actions in chapter 11 have come to promote policy goals wholly divorced 
from those asserted by Congress in the legislative history. Preference law in 
chapter 11 should be understood as a strategic tool for chapter 11 debtors to 
wield in negotiations with creditors, and not as an effort to equalize 
repayment among creditors or to deter pre-bankruptcy collection efforts.27 
This theory is grounded primarily in data gathered from interviews with trade 
creditors, debtors, and bankruptcy attorneys involved in recently confirmed 
chapter 11 reorganizations. The principal benefit of personal interviews is 
that they can provide a clarity and richness to the discussion that is difficult 
to draw from other research devices, and they may reveal the motivations, 
intentions, or beliefs of the actors involved.28 While findings from a limited 
set of interviews cannot support definitive statements regarding the world,29 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See discussion infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (“In a chapter 11, where the debtor 
proposes a plan and it gets confirmed and old management becomes new management and 
equity goes away, and unsecured creditors become equity, there really is no major push on 
preferences.”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“[I]f you’re a debtor and you 
have an ongoing business and you don’t have the watchful eye of the creditor’s committee or 
you’re not constantly in front of the judge and you’re kind of done with your case, your need 
at that point in time to file a preference action goes down precipitously.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“So, a lot of times, people wait until after the plan is 
confirmed and then sometimes they’ll pursue those actions and sometimes not.”). 
 27. See discussion infra note 208. 
 28. See Sergio Puig, Does Bureaucratic Inertia Matter in Treaty Bargaining? Or, Toward 
a Greater Use of Qualitative Data in Empirical Legal Inquiries, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 
317, 320 (2013) (“Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as quantitative research, and 
provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal behavior.”). Furthermore, the nature of 
preference settlements makes quantitative analysis inherently difficult. As most preference 
actions are settled prior to even a motion for summary judgment, the data on settlements and 
settlement negotiations is not easy to gather. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) 
(“When it does come down and we have clients that do get sued for preference? They settle.”).  
 29. See Ellie Fossey, Carol Harvey, Fiona McDermott & Larry Davidson, Understanding 
and Evaluating Qualitative Research, 36 AUSTL. & N. Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 730 (2002); 
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these findings nevertheless provide valuable insight into how preferences 
function, and may point to further avenues of research.30 
In a previous article, I reported that all creditors and attorneys interviewed 
in this study indicated that creditors would prefer to collect past due 
payments from the debtor when given the opportunity, and that attorneys 
would recommend doing so.31 Although collection could provoke a 
preference action later on, interviewees noted that the expected result of 
preference claims was settlement with the debtor for substantially less than 
the preference amount.32 This finding was consistent with broader theories 
on deterrence,33 and demonstrated that preference law as written fails to 
discourage collection behavior because preference action “punishments” are 
both unlikely to be enforced and substantially less costly than the benefit of 
engaging in a collection action against the debtor.34 In other words, all 
rational creditors would accept payments from the debtor in the ninety days 
before bankruptcy even if they knew that such a preference could be avoided 
in bankruptcy, and even if they suspected a bankruptcy filing was likely. 
Here, I show that creditors in a long-term business relationship with a 
debtor may be willing to overlook a short-term financial loss associated with 
bankruptcy discharge in favor of preserving the long-term relationship; 
however, when a trade creditor is faced with the perception that the debtor 
deliberately “used” the creditor or abused the creditor’s trust, creditors may 
instead choose to abandon the relationship.35 Being sued for a preference is 
widely perceived as such an act of betrayal, and both debtors and their 
attorneys respond accordingly.36 The evidence suggests that because 
preference litigation can severely undermine a trade creditor’s willingness to 
continue a relationship with the debtor, preference litigation is limited to 
cases where the ongoing relationship is not a matter of concern.37 
The result is that a DIP only brings preference actions against creditors 
that are less preferred. In this study, actions to avoid preferential transfers 
                                                                                                                 
Kelly J. Asmussen & John W. Creswell, Campus Response to a Student Gunman, J. HIGHER 
EDUC., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 575, 588. 
 30. See Fossey, supra note 30, at 730; THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
8 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 2011). 
 31. Brook E. Gotberg, Optimal Deterrence and the Preference Gap, 2018 BYU L. REV. 
559, 611-12.  
 32. Id. at 588. 
 33. Id. at 565-72. 
 34. Id. at 621-22. 
 35. See discussion infra notes 133-52. 
 36. See discussion infra notes 169-78. 
 37. See discussion infra note 190. 
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were not intended to bring the targeted creditor back into parity with others. 
Instead, study participants reported using preference actions to encourage 
concessions from particular creditors,38 to disallow the creditors’ claims,39 to 
exclude uncooperative creditors from voting on the plan of reorganization,40 
and to encourage the settlement or reduction of claims from these creditors.41 
Preference law was used as another method to extract concessions from 
creditors, especially those with whom the debtor did not seek an ongoing 
business relationship. These findings lead to the conclusion that preference 
law in chapter 11 requires a new theory of justification, one informed by 
relational concerns bound up in business dealings. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part One provides a brief explanation of 
the historical legislative rationale for preference actions in bankruptcy, 
academic criticism of these purported justifications, and an explanation of 
my prior work on the topic. Part Two introduces the sample group evaluated 
in this study—namely, trade creditors in small- and medium-sized chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganizations—and explains why they were particularly 
selected for evaluation. Part Three reports on study findings regarding how 
trade creditors viewed their business relationships with a debtor in cases of 
bankruptcy. Part Four discusses how preference actions impacted business 
relationships between trade creditors and debtors and explains how these 
results influenced decisions about when and where to bring preference 
actions. Part Five places these findings in the context of prior theoretical 
work regarding business relationships and suggests that preference actions 
may be better understood as a tool to manage business relationships in 
bankruptcy than as a method to ensure equality of distribution. 
I. Preference Legislative History 
Like much of modern American bankruptcy law, the idea of avoiding 
preferential transfers came from English laws on bankruptcy and insolvency, 
which were then adopted and incorporated into American jurisprudence. 
Historically, preference law closely resembled the law of fraudulent 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (“Now, sometimes a debtor will 
use the threat of preference litigation to induce the creditor to do something.”). 
 39. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017).  
 40. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“If they filed a proof of claim for 
ten million dollars but if you object and file a preference, then all of a sudden, it’s not an 
allowed claim, they can’t vote or receive anything unless they pay the preference back and it 
changes the negotiating posture with the creditor.”).  
 41. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (“And so, they filed this preference 
action just to put pressure on us to reduce our claim.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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conveyance.42 It required a finding of intent as part of establishing liability—
either the debtor’s intent to favor one creditor over another43 or the creditor’s 
knowledge that such a transfer would be preferential.44 The decision to 
move away from the intent requirement was informed by the 1973 Report of 
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which 
indicated that the intent requirement was “the most troublesome feature” of 
current preference provisions, leading to much litigation, and that “intention 
should be irrelevant.”45 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, preference law has 
moved away from analyzing the motivations of either the debtor or the 
creditor. Instead, it has purported to encourage equality among creditors by 
ensuring that a creditor that had the good fortune to be paid just before the 
bankruptcy filing is treated no differently than a creditor that was not paid in 
the days before bankruptcy.46 Preference law as written is to be enforced 
regardless of the creditor’s intention.47 Instead, the legislative history 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Countryman, supra note 4, at 716-18; John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, 
Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 250 (1981); 
Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 1448 n.21; Weisberg, supra note 8, at 4. 
 43. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 492 (repealed 1843) (declaring 
void and fraudulent all transfers of property made in contemplation of bankruptcy and for the 
purpose of giving a preference); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 
(repealed 1978) (declaring void and avoidable transfers made in contemplation of insolvency 
with a view to give a preference, and the existence of such transfers made outside the usual 
and ordinary course of business prima facie evidence of fraud). 
 44. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978) 
(declaring a preference avoidable only if the person receiving the transfer “shall have had 
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference”).  
 45. COMMISSION REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 8, at 203-04 (“That [intent] 
requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference section of the 
present Act.”). 
 46. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: 
The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, 115 (“After Congress 
removed the ‘reasonable cause to believe’ requirement in 1978, the main goal of the preference 
provision was to preserve equality of distribution; the prevention of unusual pressure or action 
by the creditor became only an incidental objective.”); Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking 
Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV. 981, 990 (1992) (submitting that it should be irrelevant whether 
preferred creditors knowingly obtained payment from a debtor likely to seek bankruptcy relief 
or not). 
 47. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (pt. 2), 94th Cong. 
1855 (1976) (“Logically and theoretically, the knowledge of the recipient of the preference 
has nothing to do with equality of distribution. Equality is determined by the fact that all 
creditors are being treated reasonably alike. So, if two creditors received a payment . . . and 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/3
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indicates that the underlying motivation is one of fairness;48 because it is 
almost universally established that not all creditors will be paid in full, 
payment should at least be equal among creditors holding similar legal 
rights.49 Although commentators disagree on the appropriate focus of 
preference law, they largely agree that the original motivation for 
establishing preference liability was to establish equality among creditors.50  
In England, preference liability still hinges on a showing that the debtor 
intended to favor one creditor over another, and a creditor may defend against 
preference liability by demonstrating that payment was prompted by the 
creditor exercising real commercial influence over the debtor, such as by 
                                                                                                                 
one had knowledge and one did not of the insolvency of the debtor, that has really no relevancy 
to equality of treatment.”). 
 48. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6297 (“Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all 
creditors are treated equally.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 177-78, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6138 (“[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of 
equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.”); COMMISSION REPORT ON 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 8, at 202 (listing three distinct goals for preference in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (“First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for 
advantage; second, it promotes equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise 
loans in order to obtain a preferential payment or security.”). 
 49. There is some departure from this principle embedded in the Bankruptcy Code itself, 
insofar as certain creditors are afforded repayment ahead of others by virtue of their priority 
status, which is delineated in 11 U.S.C. § 507. For example, domestic support obligations 
receive first priority in the order of repayment, such that other claims will not receive any 
repayment until those debts are satisfied. See id. § 507(a)(1)(A). In addition, employee wages 
up to $12,850 receive priority over most other unsecured debts and must be satisfied before 
those debts are paid. See id. § 507(a)(4).  
 50. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 47, at 115 (noting that, after 1978, “the main goal of 
preference provision was to preserve equality of distribution,” with deterrence “only an 
incidental objective”); Countryman, supra note 4, at 748 (“The function of the preference 
concept is to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution.”); 
McCoid, supra note 43, at 260 (“Preference law tries to impose equality on prebankruptcy 
behavior so that that behavior will not make the principle of equality in bankruptcy distribution 
meaningless.”); Edward S. Margolis, Advantage to Creditor: Understanding Preference 
Actions and Available Defenses, 93 ILL. B.J. 590, 590-91 (2005) (“The power to avoid 
preferences promotes the primary bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among 
creditors by insuring that all creditors of the same class receive the same pro rata share of the 
debtor’s estate.”); Rafael I. Pardo, On Proof of Preferential Effect, 55 ALA. L. REV. 281, 283 
(2004); Weisberg, supra note 8, at 4 (“Bankruptcy law empowers the trustee and the court to 
enforce ratable distribution as a matter of public power; preference law implies that the debtor 
and creditor have a private duty to save the bankruptcy process from becoming moot before it 
has a chance to start.”). 
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bringing or threatening a lawsuit.51 In the United States, however, the 
intentions of both debtor and creditor are irrelevant;52 it is only the effect of 
the transfer that matters. Accordingly, a creditor who accepts a payment with 
no knowledge of the debtor’s insolvency may be found liable for a 
preference, even absent any evidence that the debtor intended to prefer the 
creditor over others. 
Some have argued that, in addition to its function as an equalizer among 
unsecured creditors, preference law also serves as a deterrent against creditor 
efforts to sidestep inclusion in the pro rata distribution afforded under the 
bankruptcy system. However, the actual deterrent effect of preference law is 
highly suspect.53 The purported deterrent force of preference law rests on 
some flawed assumptions that simply are not reflected in real-world 
experience. As explained by Lawrence Ponoroff, the belief appears to be that: 
without a preference law, creditors that supposedly might 
otherwise have been inclined to work with the debtor will feel 
obliged to swoop in to claim their share of the available spoils as 
soon [sic] they learn that the debtor has come upon financially-
troubled waters. Thus, the debtor’s slide into bankruptcy will 
become inevitable. But, with the existence of preference liability, 
the reasoning goes, any such efforts will be futile, so that the 
creditors will say, “shucks, no point if I’m just going to have to 
give it back.”54 
In my research, creditors usually do not make such a pre-calculation, 
because they are unaware of preference law or because they consider 
preference litigation to be a remote possibility. Even when creditors do 
anticipate preference liability, they typically use cost/benefit analysis to 
determine that they will be better off collecting now, risking the possibility 
of repaying some part of what they collected later.55 This is not to say that 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Adrian Walters, Preferences, in VULNERABLE TRANSACTIONS IN CORPORATE 
INSOLVENCY 123 (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds., 2003). 
 52. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 178, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6138 
(discussing the reasons for doing away with the requirement that a creditor be aware of the 
debtor’s insolvency).  
 53. Gotberg, supra note 31, at 613; Tabb, supra note 47, at 990 (“Deterrence is effective, 
however, only against parties who are aware of the debtor’s financial distress and who 
therefore see the collective proceeding coming. Innocent parties by definition will not be 
deterred; the state of the preference law will have no impact on their behavior.”). 
 54. Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard the 
Flight from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 344 (2016). 
 55. See Gotberg, supra note 31, at 611-12.  
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preference law does not affect creditor behavior, but it does not do so in ways 
that are particularly beneficial to the debtor.56 Further, creditors are 
consistently advised by their attorneys to take preferential payments when 
they are offered.57 Accordingly, it is unclear what deterrent effect preference 
laws have. This leaves the enforcement of equality principles as the primary 
remaining goal identified in the legislative history. As explained below, 
chapter 11 preference avoidance actions serve neither of the rationales given 
in the legislative history, but instead promote an entirely different policy 
goal. Put simply, in chapter 11 the availability of preference avoidance 
actions increases a debtor’s leverage over creditors.  
II. Trade Creditors and Bankruptcy Proceedings 
A. Introducing Trade Creditors 
Technically, any creditor who has received a transfer from the debtor in 
the ninety-day preference period may be subject to a preference action.58 
However, liable parties are most frequently unsecured creditors, for the 
simple reason that preference actions are only available when the targeted 
transfer allows the creditor to receive more than it would have had the 
transfer not been made and property distributed pursuant to chapter 7 
principles.59 Secured creditors are generally immune from preference 
liability, because they are paid in full up to the amount of their collateral, 
even in bankruptcy proceedings.60 In contrast, unsecured creditors rarely 
receive 100% of their claims in bankruptcy, such that any transfer in the 
preference period will serve to improve their position under preference 
laws.61 The population of unsecured creditors in small- and medium-sized 
chapter 11 cases is largely made of up of so-called trade creditors.62 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Ponoroff, supra note 55, at 345 (“Of course, overlooked in this simplistic and 
rosy picture of creditor behavior is the fact that the existence of a preference law might just as 
easily motivate a creditor, otherwise inclined to work with the debtor, to race to the courthouse 
and grab the debtor’s remaining assets with the hope not only of getting ahead of its fellow 
creditors, but also of getting ahead of the ninety-day clock.”).  
 57. See Gotberg, supra note 31, at 610-11. 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2018). 
 59. See id. § 547(b)(5).  
 60. See id. § 506(a).  
 61. See Countryman, supra note 4, at 736-37. 
 62. Although they also appear in large chapter 11 cases, trade creditors are treated 
differently depending on the size of the case. See Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The 
Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., 
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Although the term “trade creditor” does not appear in the Bankruptcy 
Code and is not subject to a universal definition, it is generally understood to 
embody those unsecured creditors who have been engaged in business 
transactions with the debtor on the basis of short-term credit.63 Trade 
creditors may or may not have signed a formal contract with the debtor, and 
they may have short- or long-term relationships with the debtor. The 
exchanges between trade creditors and debtors are presumptively unsecured, 
because the parties tend to be engaged in transactions in which the grant of a 
security interest would be impractical. This is perhaps due to the small size 
or informal nature of the transactions.64 However, some trade creditors may 
be able to obtain liens (such as mechanics’ liens) or other possessory interests 
in the debtor’s assets.65 
Trade creditors are frequently overlooked in discussions of bankruptcy 
policy, perhaps because their importance is overshadowed by the influence 
of other parties, such as a post-petition financier66 or a pre-petition secured 
creditor with an interest in essential collateral.67 Although unsecured trade 
creditors do not have an interest in collateral held by the debtor, they 
nevertheless control an asset in which the debtor is invested—the future 
goods and services of the creditor, to which the debtor has often become 
accustomed and which may be vital to the smooth operation of the debtor’s 
business. In this regard, some trade creditors may be more essential than 
                                                                                                                 
Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), https://perma.cc/EUW8-GDXD (“Small businesses in 
Chapter 11 (and the vast majority are small) are qualitatively different from larger ones.”). 
 63. See DON B. BRADLEY, III & MICHAEL J. RUBACH, TRADE CREDIT AND SMALL 
BUSINESSES: A CASE OF BUSINESS FAILURES 1 (2002), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
download?doi=10.1.1.508.7600&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 64. For other insights on how and why trade credit is used, see Mariassunta Giannetti et 
al., What You Sell Is What You Lend?: Explaining Trade Credit Contracts, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1261, 1262 (2008).  
 65. See Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the Failure 
of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 DICK. L. REV. 267, 295 (2001).  
 66. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“[Y]ou can’t go into bankruptcy 
without having cash flow or . . . a financing friend.”).  
 67. See Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 142 (“Today, senior secured debt rules.”). The importance of a 
secured creditor is due in large part to the ability of such a creditor to influence the bankruptcy 
case by virtue of the leverage it holds on the debtor’s collateral. See Stuart C. Gilson & 
Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical 
Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1011-12 (1994) (reporting on a study analyzing 381 
publicly held firms that experience severe stock price declines, which found a 52% likelihood 
of management turnover, often accredited to the pressure of banks, with more senior and 
secured claims exercising a greater weight of influence).  
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others, depending on the importance of the trade creditor’s business to the 
function of the debtor’s, the availability of alternatives, and other similar 
factors. In the example given above,68 Owen’s Ovens provides a specialized 
service and is the only provider of molded fiber ovens in Debtor Daniels’ 
area. On the other hand, Patty’s Paper Pulp is a more generic product for 
which alternatives and additional vendors are readily available. In some 
cases, creditors and debtors may become mutually reliant on each other by 
virtue of co-specialization, each having adjusted their business to the use of 
the other’s product.69 Generally speaking, the more specialized, unique, or 
difficult it is to obtain a good or service, and the more essential it is to the 
debtor’s operations, the more important it is to maintain good relations with 
the provider of that good or service and to secure his or her cooperation in 
the bankruptcy proceedings.70  
B. Trade Creditors’ Influence in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
If trade creditors respond to a bankruptcy filing by refusing to do business 
with the debtor in the future, then reorganization is likely to be impossible; 
without the goods and services necessary to run the business, the debtor will 
simply be unable to continue operations. Absent a pre-existing contractual 
relationship,71 the Bankruptcy Code contains no obligation that creditors 
continue to do business with a debtor after a bankruptcy filing, even on a cash 
basis.72 Moreover, there is no obligation that a creditor provide post-petition 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See discussion supra notes 18-19. 
 69. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1101 (1981) (“The essence of the problem is that, even where perfectly 
substitutable trading parties are initially available in a competitive market, the increasing 
specialization of the parties vis-a-vis each other produces a species of bilateral monopoly.”).  
 70. See Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (noting that, prior to filing, 
debtor’s counsel must consult with the client regarding what the vendor reaction is likely to 
be, and that such reaction varies depending on how unique or replaceable the vendor’s goods 
are).  
 71. Creditors who breach a contract with the debtor will be liable for damages associated 
with breach. Likewise, a debtor may be liable if it breaches a contract with a creditor; however, 
the breach will be treated as a pre-bankruptcy obligation and paid out pursuant to the chapter 
11 plan. This usually means that the unsecured debt incurred by the breach will be significantly 
reduced, as it will be paid out on a pro rata basis with all other unsecured debt. See generally 
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).  
 72. But see id. § 525 (establishing protections against discriminatory treatment by 
governmental units or private employers solely because a debtor filed for bankruptcy).  
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trade credit to a debtor, which may be sorely needed in light of cash 
constraints.73 
Debtors in chapter 11 frequently have a strong incentive to placate trade 
creditors in order to ensure ongoing business relationships and a positive vote 
on the chapter 11 Plan. Locating a replacement source of goods and services, 
even if it can be done, will almost always require time and energy on the part 
of the debtor, and the terms offered post-bankruptcy are rarely more 
favorable than the terms obtained pre-bankruptcy.74 In addition, although 
individual trade creditors typically lack the voting power of secured 
creditors,75 as a group they can influence the outcome of the case by choosing 
to support or reject a DIP’s plan of reorganization.76  
As with any other group of creditors, the DIP depends on the cooperation 
of trade creditors to vote in favor of a bankruptcy plan in order to ensure 
confirmation by the court.77 In situations where the DIP faces an 
uncooperative secured creditor, votes from trade creditors may be 
particularly vital in order to ensure a “cramdown” plan.78 In the event that a 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled 
Organizational Image and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405, 417 (1987) 
(“[I]ndividuals or organizations that participate in relationships with bankrupt firms can often 
negotiate more favorable terms of exchange than previously existed; the fact of Chapter 11 
increases their bargaining power.”); Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) (“[I]t’s 
very difficult for any business to stay in business if they can’t get at least 30-day credit, 30 to 
60.”); discussion infra note 129.  
 74. See Lubben, supra note 65, at 296 (“[I]t is hard to envision any system of 
reorganization functioning without a means to ensure the cooperation of at least a core group 
of the debtor’s suppliers.”).  
 75. Any individual secured creditor has the power to make a Plan nonconsensual by 
voting against it, because consensual plans require the approval of all classes, and secured 
creditors are typically a class in and of themselves. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018); Jack 
Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1495, 1500 (1992) (“The general rule . . . is that each secured claim is almost always 
placed in its own separate class because each has different rights regarding collateral and 
priority.”). 
 76. Trade creditors can be, and typically are, lumped into a single class. See 11 U.S.C. § 
1122. A class is considered to have accepted the plan of reorganization if at least two-thirds 
of the class, measured by the combined amount of their claims, and more than one-half of the 
number of creditors have accepted the plan. Id. § 1126(c).  
 77. See id. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that each impaired class of claims has accepted the 
plan).  
 78. See id. § 1129(b). Although the term “cramdown” does not appear in the Code, it is 
common parlance for the alternative path to plan confirmation that involves the consent of 
only one class of creditors. A cramdown plan involves additional oversight by the court and 
adherence to additional requirements. These requirements include obtaining a court 
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secured creditor is undersecured and bifurcates its claim into secured and 
unsecured classes,79 trade creditor support may be even more vital in order 
to outweigh the undersecured creditor’s veto, especially if there is only one 
class of unsecured creditors.80 The influence that any individual trade creditor 
will have on the acceptance of the plan will depend largely on how creditors 
are classified and the size of the classes, in addition to the size of the 
individual creditor’s claim. 
Beyond the vote, trade creditors may have an impact on the chapter 11 
case by virtue of being part of a creditor’s committee, which may be formed 
by the United States trustee to oversee the proceedings and raise issues with 
the court as needed.81 Such a committee is typically formed by the holders of 
the largest unsecured claims against the debtor,82 which frequently will 
include some number of trade creditors. The committee is entitled to appoint 
an attorney or another professional representative (such as an accountant) to 
oversee its interests and investigate the DIP.83 The representative will be 
paid, not by the trade creditors directly, but rather from bankruptcy estate 
                                                                                                                 
determination that the plan does not discriminate unfairly, but is instead fair and equitable 
with respect to each class of claims or interests impaired under the plan. Perhaps the most 
difficult of these requirements is that the plan “be fair and equitable,” which is defined in the 
Code as requiring all junior interest holders to forfeit their interests in the debtor unless and 
until more senior interest holders have been satisfied in full. See id. § 1129(b)(2). This 
“absolute priority” rule can mean that a debtor’s principals must sacrifice their equity in order 
to confirm a plan, which is often a tenuous result, especially for closely-held organizations. 
See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1182-83 (4th ed. 2016). A potential 
escape hatch for equity holders is the “new value corollary” to the absolute priority rule, which 
could allow former equity holders to repurchase their equity by virtue of a fresh infusion of 
value through the chapter 11 plan. Although the contribution of new value in exchange for old 
equity is not explicitly permitted in the Bankruptcy Code, it has been implicitly recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North Lasalle 
Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 449 (1999).  
 79. An undersecured creditor may—but is not required to—avoid bifurcation by electing 
to treat the entire undersecured claim as fully secured. In doing so, the creditor forfeits the 
right to the present value of its claim and accepts a nominal dollar amount (usually paid out 
over time) instead. This is commonly called the “§1111(b) election.” See 11 U.S.C. § 
1111(b)(2).  
 80. There is some uncertainty in the law over whether a debtor can classify the unsecured 
portion of a secured creditor’s claim separately in order to establish a consenting class in a 
cramdown situation. See Linda J. Rusch, Gerrymandering the Classification Issue in Chapter 
Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 163, 164 (1992).  
 81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a).  
 82. See id. § 1102(b).  
 83. See id. § 1103(a), (c).  
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assets as an administrative expense.84 The appointment of such a committee 
thus imposes an additional level of pressure on the DIP to acknowledge 
concerns held by the unsecured creditors represented by the creditors’ 
committee, both because the committee has the ability to demand 
information from the DIP and to file motions with the bankruptcy court, and 
because work performed by the committee will be at the expense of the 
debtor’s estate. A cooperative committee can facilitate the reorganization 
process; an uncooperative committee can introduce significant time delays 
and added expense to the process.85 
Finally, the cooperation of trade creditors can be a meaningful signal to 
other important players about the viability of the debtor over the long term. 
Potential financiers of the debtor may look to the willingness of trade 
creditors to extend short-term credit to the debtor in evaluating whether they 
are willing to invest for longer periods of time.86 Courts may look to the 
expressed willingness of trade creditors to continue in business with the 
debtor as a signal that a plan of reorganization is feasible.87 Ultimately, trade 
creditors have a significant role to play in the success of a debtor’s 
reorganization that should not be overlooked or understated.88 
  
                                                                                                                 
 84. See id. § 503(b)(4). 
 85. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“[A] lot of the debtors consider it 
just more cost and interference. But, I think a sophisticated debtor attorney doesn’t really mind 
a committee of truly unsecured trade creditors because at the end of the day you want that 
class to accept. And, that can be your vehicle to try to get the acceptance.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (“You want them to work with you, because Chapter 11 
is a collaborative process . . . . Most cases that I’ve experienced where you have a lot of 
creditor animosity will not be successful because the debtor will spend too much time and 
money fighting as opposed to focusing on restructuring. So, without a collaborative effort the 
successful Chapter 11 process I think is hindered substantially.”).  
 86. See Lubben, supra note 65, at 295.  
 87. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (requiring that the court find that “[c]onfirmation of [a] 
chapter 11 plan is not likely to be followed by [a] liquidation, or [a] need for further financial 
reorganization”).  
 88. See Lubben, supra note 65, at 294 (“The trade creditor . . . is one of the most neglected 
and misunderstood parties in Chapter 11 theory.”). That said, it is a common perception among 
attorneys that, of the three groups, trade creditors are typically the most insignificant in a 
bankruptcy case. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with 
DA (June 6, 2017) (“[R]ealistically, trade creditors, except for the ones that you have to have, 
the critical vendors, they have no leverage. You just ignore them.”); Telephone Interview with 
CA (June 21, 2017) (“[M]y experience is that unless they’re on a committee then you don’t 
really care much from trade.”).  
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C. Trade Creditors as a Study Group 
I decided to focus my research on preference actions against trade 
creditors in the bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized companies for both 
practical and substantive reasons. On the practical side, I was concerned that 
it would prove difficult to arrange interviews with individuals at larger 
institutions who would be both willing to speak with me and able to provide 
meaningful insight regarding how company decisionmakers reacted to a 
bankruptcy filing or a preference lawsuit. Further, I assumed that small- and 
medium-sized companies were more likely to be affected by an individual 
bankruptcy filing or preference lawsuit, and would therefore be a more likely 
source for feedback.89 Substantively, it made more sense to focus on the use 
of preference actions in small- and medium-sized cases because they 
represent the bulk of chapter 11 filings; although they are processed in the 
same chapter as mega-cases, they function very differently in practice.90 
Similarly, I wanted to focus on the impact of preference actions on parties 
most likely to be targeted by such actions, which in these smaller cases were 
unsecured trade creditors. Although there are interesting insights to be 
gleaned from studies of other types of creditors in chapter 11,91 and I freely 
acknowledge that such insights are not included in these results, 
considerations of scope made it necessary to limit my findings to this group. 
I also consciously limited my study to chapter 11 cases in which a plan of 
reorganization had been successfully confirmed. Many filed chapter 11 cases 
do not result in a confirmed plan, and are instead dismissed or converted to a 
chapter 7 case, in which liquidation is the only possible outcome.92 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See Michael J. Peel, Nicholas Wilson & Carole Howorth, Late Payment and Credit 
Management in the Small Firm Sector: Some Empirical Evidence, INT’L SMALL BUS. J., Jan. 
2000, at 17, 18 (noting the problems caused by late payment or nonpayment of credit for 
smaller firms in the UK).  
 90. See Baird, Bris & Zhu, supra note 62; Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11 – Does One Size Fit 
All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 168 (1996) (questioning whether chapter 11 is elastic 
enough to accommodate the different entities filing under it); George W. Kuney, ABI 
Commission Testimony: November 7, 2013, 15 TENN. J. BUS. L. 333, 334 (2014) (arguing for 
revision of the Bankruptcy Code to allow for different treatment for small businesses).  
 91. For example, the interactions between debtors and lenders is a worthy area of study. 
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 159 (1997).  
 92. A study of chapter 11 cases filed between 1989 and 1995 indicated that “35.3 percent 
of the cases were dismissed and 35.4 percent were converted [to chapter 7].” See Ed Flynn & 
Gordon Bermont, Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases U.S. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on 
Old Questions, AM. BANKR. INST. (Feb. 1, 1998), https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/outcomes-
of-chapter-11-cases-us-trustee-database-sheds-new-light-on-old-questions; Stephen J. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1032 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1013 
 
 
Furthermore, a significant portion of confirmed plans result in the liquidation 
of the filing debtor.93 In deciding to focus only on reorganized cases, I noted 
that preliminary inquiries had suggested that the treatment of preferential 
transfers was significantly different between cases of liquidation and 
reorganization, as explained in greater depth below.94 The simple reason for 
this distinction was that in liquidation cases, neither party was concerned 
with the effect of its actions on the business relationship, as the business 
relationship would necessarily end. Furthermore, in liquidation cases, parties 
besides the debtor were typically responsible for deciding whether, when, 
and how to bring preference actions.95 Accordingly, this analysis applies only 
in the context of reorganization, and may not (indeed, is unlikely to) hold in 
liquidation scenarios. 
I further narrowed the scope of my potential pool of interviewees by only 
contacting individuals in cases in which a preference action had been filed, 
reflective of my particular interest in how preference actions were being used 
and how they impacted trade creditors. Accordingly, my study was not, and 
was not intended to be, reflective of the entire population of scenarios, or 
even representative of cases that are filed. Instead, I sought out information 
from parties in circumstances that were more relevant to my underlying 
interest, which was how preferences impact a trade creditor’s ongoing 
business relationship with a debtor. However, in interviews with attorneys or 
credit managers, these repeat players often referenced or compared their 
experiences in chapter 11 to what they had seen in liquidation cases, large 
cases, cases with lenders, or other circumstances not targeted for study. 
Finally, I looked to cases that had been closed sometime in the previous 
five years. I reasoned that, in limiting the scope of my research temporally, I 
would be more likely to encounter businesses that were still in existence and 
the subjects I contacted would be more likely to clearly remember the 
                                                                                                                 
Lubben, Business Liquidations 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 66-68 (2007) (“Very few creditors 
ultimately receive the benefits of a chapter 11 liquidation – most chapter 11 cases convert to 
chapter 7 and very few liquidating plans are ultimately confirmed.”). 
 93. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The 
Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 319 (1992) (“Of the 42 cases in 
which the nature of the confirmed plan could be determined in the Poughkeepsie Study, 11 
were liquidating plans or about 26 percent. Similarly, the Flynn Study estimated that 
approximately 25 percent of the confirmed cases had liquidating plans.”); Elizabeth Warren 
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 603, 641 (2009) (noting that less than 21% of confirmed Chapter 11 plans to be 
liquidating plans).  
 94. See discussion infra note 212. 
 95. See discussion infra note 214. 
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bankruptcy. I discovered that, even with this precaution, there were 
inevitably subjects who had gone out of business or changed locations by the 
time I attempted to contact them. In addition, I encountered individual 
representatives of companies named in bankruptcy filings who had not 
themselves been involved in the bankruptcy proceedings, often because they 
joined the company after the bankruptcy filing had taken place. 
In order to identify possible subjects, I used the Bloomberg Law search 
engine to pull public bankruptcy records for all chapter 11 cases with a 
confirmed plan that closed sometime between August 30, 2010 and February 
1, 2017. I limited my search to companies with assets and liabilities in the 
range of $1 million to $100 million that also listed unsecured trade creditors 
in their schedules. Within the bankruptcy cases that fit these size and date 
requirements, I looked for debtors that had filed a preference action against 
a creditor, searching within court documents for any reference to § 547 (the 
Bankruptcy Code section for preference avoidance).96 This group became my 
base sample. 
For each of the cases within my sample, I identified the top twenty 
unsecured creditors, as listed by the debtor on Official Form 4. I further 
identified any additional creditors who were the subject of a preference 
lawsuit, as reflected in the court record. Beginning with the five most recent 
cases, and then taking one case at a time from the base sample group in 
alphabetical order, I contacted these creditors, the debtor, and all the 
attorneys who had entered an appearance in the case.97 Because I was 
primarily interested in actions against trade creditors, I excluded taxing 
                                                                                                                 
 96. The Bankruptcy Code allows for actions similar to preference avoidance in other 
sections, which target specific behavior. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (2018) (allowing the 
trustee to recover the amount set off by a creditor in the ninety days before bankruptcy on a 
preference-like analysis). However, I did not target these provisions for consideration in my 
study.  
 97. I began by sending introductory letters to individuals whose contact information was 
listed in association with the creditors, debtors, and attorneys in my study. A copy of the letter 
is attached as Appendix D. I continued to contact individuals associated with cases in the base 
sample, beginning with the five most recent cases and then proceeding in alphabetical order, 
until I had sent mailings to approximately 350 individuals. A few weeks after mailing the 
letters, I attempted to call the individual creditors, debtors, and attorneys for whom I could 
locate telephone numbers. Some individuals responded to my letter with requests not to be 
contacted. For others, the introductory letter was returned as undeliverable. In these cases, I 
did not make further attempts to contact the parties. If I was successful in reaching an 
individual I made the request to interview him or her for this study. In many cases, I left 
messages on voicemail or with an assistant. Where I left messages, I attempted a second phone 
call before abandoning the contact.  
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entities, insiders, creditors subject to an action under § 544,98 and judgment 
creditors.99 Finally, due to language constraints and concerns regarding 
communication costs, I excluded all creditors located outside the United 
States. 
Through these efforts, I was able to obtain complete interviews from forty-
eight individuals,100 including twenty-eight creditors, three debtors,101 and 
seventeen attorneys.102 These individuals were drawn from a total of twelve 
bankruptcy cases. Of the attorneys, ten identified primarily as debtors’ 
                                                                                                                 
 98. These would typically be creditors who had not perfected their otherwise valid 
security interests prior to the bankruptcy filing. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544, a bankruptcy 
trustee is afforded all the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor who obtained a judicial lien over 
all of the debtor’s property as of the commencement of the case. Pursuant to the rules of 
secured transactions, as reflected in UCC § 9-317(a), the bankruptcy trustee would prevail 
over any secured creditor not perfected as of the date of filing.  
 99. The exclusion of judgment creditors was due primarily to my desire to focus on how 
bankruptcy filings and preference actions affected business relationships between debtors and 
creditors. When creditors were identified as judgment creditors, it appeared to distinguish 
them from creditors who were or had been engaged in ongoing business dealings with the 
debtor (“trade creditors”). I did not deliberately exclude trade creditors who had obtained a 
judgment against the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing.  
 100. Sampling for a qualitative research project is not necessarily a straightforward 
endeavor, and there is some difference of opinion regarding the number of observations that 
are sufficient to draw conclusions. However, the accepted literature indicates that this sample 
size is within the range generally considered acceptable for a qualitative study. See Mark 
Mason, Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews, FORUM: 
QUALITATIVE SOC. RES., Sept. 2010, at 3, 10-13 (2010) (citing research suggesting that twenty-
five to fifty participants are adequate, and that little “new” comes of out transcripts after twenty 
interviews).  
 101. The ratio of debtor to creditor interviews largely reflects the overall ratio within cases. 
Obviously, each individual debtor had multiple creditors. In addition, I found it difficult to 
locate debtors to interview, as the individuals involved during a bankruptcy case were 
frequently no longer associated with the company, their contact information had changed, or 
they simply did not care to speak with me regarding their experiences. In several cases, 
although the business continued as a going concern following chapter 11, it was through a sale 
of substantially all assets to a new buyer, making the contact information listed in court filings 
utterly obsolete. Accordingly, my findings are significantly skewed with regards to the 
experience of creditors, although there is some insight to be had from the interviews I 
conducted with debtors’ attorneys, who often reported on the reactions they received in 
advising debtors on bankruptcy and preference actions.  
 102. One attorney interviewed was referred to me by another study participant and so was 
not contacted by virtue of his involvement in one of the sample cases. This attorney was 
referred to me as someone particularly experienced in preference actions for mid-sized 
companies. As explained below, because all attorneys spoke generally regarding their overall 
experiences rather than providing specifics for a given case, participation in a case within the 
sample was not essential.  
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counsel. The remaining seven primarily represented creditors, although 
virtually all attorneys had some experience working with both debtor and 
creditor clients. Combined, the attorneys represented over 515 years of 
experience. Among creditors, the size of the company with which individuals 
were associated varied widely. Some creditors interviewed were sole 
practitioners or “mom and pop” shops, while others were associated with 
large international organizations. Interviewees self-identified as owners, 
part-owners, CFOs, and credit managers of their companies. They 
represented a diverse population geographically, hailing from eighteen 
different states including New York, Florida, and California as well as 
Kansas, Michigan, and North Dakota.  
All interviews were conducted in a five-month period, between May 18, 
2017 and October 18, 2017. Interviews lasted anywhere from ten minutes to 
over an hour, with most falling in the range of fifteen- to twenty-minute 
conversations. A discussion of the findings from these interviews follows. 
III. Bankruptcy and Business Relationships 
A. Study Findings 
In my interviews with trade creditors, I followed a set script that asked 
some preliminary questions regarding the creditor’s size and type of 
business. The script then asked about the creditor’s pre-bankruptcy 
relationship with the debtor and then the creditor’s reaction upon receiving 
news of the debtor’s bankruptcy. It then inquired whether the creditor 
continued to do business with the debtor after the bankruptcy filing. For 
creditors that had been the subject of a preference action, the script asked 
about the creditor’s reactions upon learning of the preference demand, as well 
as how the creditor ultimately responded to the preference demand. 
Throughout, creditors were invited to share their thoughts on the bankruptcy 
proceedings and if there were ways in which the experience could have been 
better.103 
In addition to interviewing creditors, I also interviewed some debtors. I 
was less successful in locating debtors willing to be interviewed, but the 
debtors who participated in the study spoke about their experiences, how 
their relationships with creditors did or did not change as a result of the filing, 
and how they had made decisions regarding whether to bring preference 
actions.104 
                                                                                                                 
 103. A copy of the interview script used is attached as Appendix A.  
 104. A copy of the interview script used with debtors is attached as Appendix B.  
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Finally, I included in the study a large number of attorneys who 
represented both debtors and creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings. In 
order to avoid violating confidentiality or imposing upon attorney-client 
privilege, I asked attorneys to give their general thoughts on how debtors and 
creditors navigated the bankruptcy process, and more specifically how the 
decision to pursue a preference was made. I also asked questions regarding 
their perceptions on how bankruptcy and preference actions influenced 
business relationships between debtors and creditors.105 
Most of the creditors and creditors’ attorneys I interviewed indicated that, 
in cases where a business partner had filed for bankruptcy, creditors were 
inclined to continue to do business with the debtor, provided there was 
certainty in receiving payment going forward. To some extent, however, this 
was informed by the nature of the business relationship prior to the 
bankruptcy and the behavior of the debtor within the bankruptcy 
proceedings. Creditors were particularly sensitive to the perceived reasons 
for the bankruptcy filing in the first place, including whether it stemmed from 
external influences or the debtor’s individual trustworthiness. Creditors also 
commented on the credit terms that the debtor would be afforded, 
demonstrating some inclination to tighten credit post-bankruptcy but usually 
not to withhold credit altogether. These findings are explained in more detail 
below.  
1. Forward-Looking Profits 
Participants interviewed in this study largely expressed the sentiment that 
future profits were more important than past losses and were therefore a 
greater influence on decision-making. As expressed by one creditor: 
[G]etting our product on the shelf is way more important than the 
debt. So, we kind of overlook a lot of those things and we work 
with our customers because we don’t want to lose that shelf space, 
and we don’t want to lose any cooler space, so we really make 
sure that our customers are a priority for us.106 
Another creditor noted,  
I think we still have a good relationship with the managers, with 
the company. . . . [T]he name was changed and the whole structure 
changed but the projects we were working on were still viable 
                                                                                                                 
 105. A copy of the interview script used for both debtors’ and creditors’ attorneys is 
attached as Appendix C. 
 106. Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017).  
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projects and we continued to do work on them. It didn’t end our 
relationship because we didn’t get paid, it just hampered it. . . . 
[Y]ou never want to give up on a client that you have had some 
success in helping them and they want to continue utilizing your 
services, so, the bankruptcy is kind of rough waters, not 
necessarily ending of the relationship.107  
Other creditors also reported making decisions based on the opportunity 
to preserve the business going forward. As one put it, “we’re in the business 
to make money,” and doing business going forward often presented an 
opportunity to make a profit.108 Court oversight of a DIP proved to be a 
reassuring influence for some. As one credit manager observed,  
If you continue to go forward[, i]t’s actually better to sell to a 
company when they’re [a] debtor in possession, th[a]n when 
they’re not because they have a court order allowing them to 
continue as a debtor in possession[. T]hey have to pay those 
bills.109 
Attorneys observed that creditors were likely to take a bankruptcy filing 
in stride as an inevitable risk to be managed,110 and that post-filing business 
was often desirable as a way of obtaining a profit, which might offset the loss 
inherent in writing off bankruptcy debt.111 It was more unusual to see 
creditors flatly refuse to do business with a debtor after filing,112 although 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017). 
 108. Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with C 
(July 11, 2017) (“We invested the write-off of our claim, but it’s been, you know, we’ve still 
maintained a long-term client and they continue to pay us whatever we bill them, at our 
standard rates. So, it’s a good paying, good realization in our world, a good margin for us.”). 
 109. Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017).  
 110. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“It’s usually pretty . . . 
diplomatic. . . . Nobody’s getting really personal on things. . . . It’s just kind of business as 
usual.”). 
 111. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“I think for the most part, at least 
our clients, I mean it’s not like they get hopping mad about it, I think many of them accept it 
as a cost of doing business.”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (“Tomorrow’s 
sale is more important than yesterday’s payment.”); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 
2017) (observing that trade creditors think about being paid going forward); Telephone 
Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (claiming that trade creditors are primarily concerned with 
not being “stung a second time around”); see also Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 
2017) (“[U]sually you end up working together which is why in most cases, by the time you 
get to the confirmation period, we like to say it’s a ‘love-fest.’”).  
 112. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“I think it was exceedingly rare 
where a supplier would say, ‘I just don’t want to do business.’ That was very rare.”); 
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creditor responses could vary depending on various factors, including the 
sophistication of the creditor and the size of the claim.113 As explained by 
one debtor’s attorney with over thirty-five years of experience in the field,  
[Y]ou get a really mixed reaction. . . . But, generally I have found 
that the unsecured creditors tend to work with the company[. Y]ou 
know, they may get over some initial reluctance, but usually I 
think their best interest is served by continuing the relationship 
because they are selling to the debtor[] or providing goods and 
services on an ongoing basis. And once in the [chapter] 11 the 
debtor has to pay for them on a current basis[. A]nd on top of that 
there’s a chance for them to get paid something back on the pre-
petition claim. So, I haven’t found that it’s an altogether hostile 
environment. Although, if there is distrust or there has been a long 
pre-bankruptcy history between the debtors and the creditors, that 
can lead to some ill will that you have to overcome during the 
case.114 
Despite this consensus, there were multiple creditors within the sample 
who reported that they would not do business with a debtor following a 
bankruptcy filing, in many instances referencing the costs associated with the 
debtor’s default or the bankruptcy itself. In several instances, the debtor’s 
failure to pay triggered payment obligations on the part of the creditor that 
were particularly onerous, as in cases where the creditor represented a 
facilitator for the transfer of goods.115 In one particularly dramatic example, 
the debtor’s bankruptcy filing triggered obligations for the creditor that 
forced the creditor to close its business entirely. A few months after that, the 
principal of the creditor—who had inherited the company from his father—
                                                                                                                 
Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (indicating that a bankruptcy filing impacts 
business relationships “[n]ot as much as you might expect”).  
 113. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017).  
 114. Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with 
DA (July 14, 2017) (“[W]hen they find out they’re in trouble there’s sort of a mixed reaction 
from the creditors.”).  
 115. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“[For] the smaller local 
companies, [bankruptcy] can be a big impact and it can be a significant shock to them.”); 
Telephone Interview with PC-R (Sept. 7, 2017) (“[W]hat we had to do was take $30,000 from 
our savings and pay these people . . . . So, he paid the suppliers and we just sat and waited, 
hoping to get the money back from [the debtor]. We never did.”); Telephone Interview with 
PC (Sept. 14, 2017) (“You don’t just lose the money that they didn’t pay you. You have to dip 
into your own pocket and pay the land owner and the trucker so that you keep your 
reputation.”).  
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took his own life.116 As reported by the creditor’s counsel in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, the forced write-off proved “catastrophic” for the creditor, such 
that the bankruptcy filing necessarily destroyed the business relationship by 
destroying the business itself.117 
Research suggests that this outcome is not altogether uncommon, although 
perhaps more extreme than the norm in its consequences. At least one study 
found that 66% of bankrupt businesses responding to a survey about non-
payment by trade creditors reported that it was a factor in forcing their own 
bankruptcy filing.118 Creditors I interviewed frequently noted the financial 
impact the bankruptcy and subsequent write-off would have on their 
company’s finances. They also pointed to the costs of monitoring and 
responding to bankruptcy filings that created financial stress on their own 
businesses.119 One reported that the experience felt like “a continued, sort-of 
death by 1,000 papercuts.”120 Ultimately, some of these creditors were 
inclined to write off the relationship along with the debt.121 
Still other creditors reported that the decision to continue in business with 
a debtor depended on the circumstances.122 The factors that influenced the 
decision largely tracked concepts of trust and commitment, consistent with 
the literature on business relationships.123 However, for most of the creditors 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017).  
 117. Id.  
 118. See BRADLEY & RUBACH, supra note 63, at 4.  
 119. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) (“[W]e thought at the end of 
the day we would spend more in attorney’s fees trying to go after this than we would in actually 
collecting anything.”). 
 120. Telephone interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017) (“[W]e were a small business and we 
ended up being, I think, unfairly damaged. . . . [W]e couldn’t or wouldn’t retain an attorney to 
try and sift through all of that. So, we were left to the mercy of the decisions of the bankruptcy 
court and ultimately, we lost about $40,000 worth of services revenues in the bankruptcy.”); 
see also Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (“[T]he general rule of thumb is if 
they’ve . . . taken you for a loop in bankruptcy or a loss in bankruptcy, you don’t want to get 
back in there.”).  
 121. See Telephone Interview with C (June 6, 2017) (“[G]enerally, we are not interested 
in continuing to do business with the post-bankruptcy corporation or estate. . . . Let’s spend 
our resources in other directions.”); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (“[T]hey 
have to give me an awfully good reason for me to continue to do business with them.”).  
 122. See Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (“It’s a case-by-case basis here. I 
worked other places that once they file and you take a loss, there’s shut down and that is it, no 
more nothing. When I came here, there would be a bankruptcy and they would turn right 
around and do business with them.”); Telephone Interview with C-N (May 22, 2017) 
(describing evaluation that includes credit management company conclusions and credit 
scores).  
 123. See discussion infra notes 155-64.  
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in the sample, the question became not whether to continue doing business 
with a debtor after bankruptcy but rather on what terms.124 
A perceived benefit (or at least, a silver lining) to doing business with a 
debtor post-bankruptcy is that payments from a debtor’s estate receive 
administrative priority.125 Furthermore, a debtor’s finances are carefully 
monitored by the court throughout the bankruptcy process.126 However, a 
significant portion of creditors interviewed indicated that, even if they were 
willing to do business with a bankrupt debtor, they would be unlikely to 
extend terms as generous as those given pre-bankruptcy.127 Many creditors 
indicated they would insist on a cash on delivery (COD) basis.128 Debtors 
also described this change in treatment, with one debtor noting, somewhat 
wistfully, “Before, you were a customer that they truly valued, and it’s a little 
bit of a shift. They now have the upper hand. They can be a little bit more 
demanding than what they might have been in the past.”129 Although it was 
less frequently acknowledged, there was some evidence that creditors would 
also raise prices for a post-petition debtor as a means of recovering lost 
profits from pre-bankruptcy sales.130  
                                                                                                                 
 124. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“[A]bsent a showing . . . that 
this customer cannot be trusted, that the reason they filed in bankruptcy in part was to defraud 
creditors. There’s still trust, notwithstanding their filing bankruptcy. And then we do see that 
there is an opportunity to preserve the trade relationship notwithstanding the Chapter 11 filing. 
And a bit to go forward is to then ask the threshold. Can we manage credit risk with continued 
credit extension with this customer?”).  
 125. See supra note 51.  
 126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2018). 
 127. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“What we often see is even with 
that, that assurance so to speak, and the priority, that may not be enough to result in the supplier 
electing to provide terms to the customer going forward.”).  
 128. See Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-JO 
(June 6, 2017) (“They can have an account, but they’ll probably have to pay as they go.”); 
Telephone Interview with C-VK (June 6, 2017); Telephone Interview with C (July 11, 2017) 
(requiring payments, if not on a COD basis, monthly); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 
2017); Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28, 2017); Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 11, 
2017); Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with CA 
(June 6, 2017) (observing that a pay upon delivery arrangement is “fairly customary” for trade 
creditors following a bankruptcy).  
 129. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with C 
(Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that the company, although now a creditor, had filed for bankruptcy 
previously and that “[it was] cash-in-advance until [it] got investment in capital in the business 
to make people feel comfortable in extending terms again”). 
 130. See Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017) (observing that some trade creditors 
insisted on critical vendor status and subsequently charged a premium in addition to 
demanding cash on delivery); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (“Of course, when 
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In summary, the consensus among those I interviewed appeared to be that 
creditors were likely to continue doing business with a bankrupt debtor, so 
long as the bankruptcy did not mean the liquidation of either party. Creditors 
were usually inclined to continue providing goods and services because the 
ongoing business would provide profits that could, at least in part, offset the 
losses inherent in the write-off of bad debt. However, creditors were not 
likely to continue doing business with debtors on the same terms as had been 
enjoyed prior to the bankruptcy; rather, debtors would likely need to provide 
cash on delivery. As explained below, however, these general principles were 
influenced by the particularities of debtor behavior, both before and during 
the bankruptcy proceedings.  
2. Influence of Behavior and Trust Prior to and During Bankruptcy 
Proceedings  
Despite the consensus that it usually makes sense for a creditor to continue 
doing business with a debtor following bankruptcy (particularly on a cash 
basis), interviewees reported some nuance and distinction in how a creditor 
reacts to a debtor in a given situation. Creditors and attorneys were quick to 
reference different factors that could make a difference in the level of a trade 
creditor’s cooperation, both in the decision to continue doing business and in 
the generosity of terms going forward. By far the two most frequently 
referenced factors were communication and honesty regarding the situation, 
both of which seemed to contribute to the creditor’s ability to further trust 
the debtor.  
Attorneys—especially debtors’ attorneys—seemed particularly attuned to 
the need for a debtor to appear forthcoming, honest, and transparent in order 
to encourage greater cooperation among creditors. As one attorney noted, 
“Your most important asset . . . in any [c]hapter 11 reorganization is the 
confidence of the creditors, the secured lenders, and that kind of thing. If the 
vendors, secured lenders, banks think you’re a crook, you’re done.”131 
Attorneys frequently advised debtors to communicate with their creditors 
                                                                                                                 
[bankruptcy] happens there are opportunities to try and make your money back that you lost. 
I mean if anybody is really being honest with you, they’re going to say that.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (“I guess maybe a more cynical view is it’s an effort to 
recoup some pre-petition receivable . . . .”). 
 131. Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with CA 
(June 21, 2017) (“[I]f they feel cheated they might want to be severing their relationship.”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (“In general, my experience has been that if 
the company or the debtor, has been generally forthcoming in its situation . . . and approaches 
the bankruptcy filing in kind of a direct, relatively honest way, in my experience trade creditors 
have not reacted negatively, have tended to be supportive.”). 
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directly. As one observed, “You need to maintain your relationship with your 
creditors as best you can. You know, it’s kind of like, hiding doesn’t do you 
any good. . . . [S]o you’re better off talking to them, trying to explain to them 
what’s going on . . . .”132 Another noted,  
I always encourage the debtor, particularly the smaller business, 
the small-to-midsize business, to have direct communications 
with the key creditors and the key vendors, explain why they’re 
there. There could be many reasons why you ended up in chapter 
11, that it’s not about their desire not to pay this particular creditor 
and work businessperson to businessperson through it. Be as up 
front as possible[.] . . . [T]he more information you can give 
creditors about what’s happening, what your timeline is, what 
your expectations are the happier they are, the more willing they 
are to work with you.133  
At times, attorneys recommended that clients communicate with creditors 
even in advance of filing, although many were also careful to point out that 
there could be strategic reasons to wait until just after the time of filing.134 
The importance of reaching out and the perceived need for timeliness in 
communication were more pronounced the more important or valuable the 
relationship was perceived to be.135 
Interviews with creditors and their attorneys reinforced the wisdom of this 
counsel. As one creditor with a relatively short history of transactions with 
the debtor prior to bankruptcy admitted,  
                                                                                                                 
 132. Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017). 
 133. Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with 
DA (May 19, 2017) (“[I]t’s talking to them, letting them know what the problem is or what it 
was, what created the problem, what were the issues. And a lot of times it’s communication 
and just trying to break down some of the barriers. Because, most of the time the unsecured 
creditors really don’t know what unique problems the debtor is facing and causing the 
problem.”).  
 134. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (“One thing that’s key from a 
debtor’s perspective is appropriate transparency.”).  
 135. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“[T]ypically, what I do [i]f I’ve got 
a small [debtor] . . . I tell them[,] . . .‘Look, if you’ve got a local supplier or contractor, 
somebody you need, get them some money before you file, tell them what you’re doing and 
why.’ And, that works. It kind of takes some of the sting out of getting a bankruptcy notice 
cold.”); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (“[E]xplain the circumstances and tell 
them that you want to keep doing business.”); Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) 
(“Where it’s an important vendor and the relationship’s important[,] my advice is usually to 
let them know either shortly in advance of the filing or upon the filing.”). 
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I mean it sort of becomes personal. . . . I don’t know if it would 
have changed if they called me prior to or would have notified me 
that they were having some financial difficulties, and so forth. 
Then maybe I would have had a better feeling about the whole 
situation. But, it was a surprise. . . . I would not want to do any 
business with them in the future.136  
The unpleasantness of surprise was echoed by others, many of whom felt 
as though an honest debtor would have or should have reached out in advance 
of the filing.137 In at least one interview, the reason given for wanting advance 
notice was not only so the creditor could prepare itself, but also so the creditor 
could have explored “some way we could have worked with them to avoid 
filing.”138 Attorneys reported seeing similar responses in practice, indicating 
that creditors were more willing to be cooperative after the fact in situations 
where creditors felt the debtor had been upfront and transparent with 
solvency issues,139 or even apologetic about the financial failure.140 One 
debtor interviewed indicated that the company had decided to inform its 
creditors of the trouble six months prior to bankruptcy, and it reported a 
particularly high level of cooperation from creditors post-bankruptcy as a 
consequence.141  
Creditors seemed to be particularly sympathetic to debtor explanations 
that identified outside factors as the ultimate cause for filing, which is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies on relationships’ response to 
stress.142 Multiple creditors reported maintaining relationships with debtors 
and being motivated to cooperate in bankruptcy proceedings because the 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Telephone Interview with C-B (July 14, 2017). 
 137. See Telephone Interview with C (June 7, 2017) (“[I]f he had tried to work with us 
before then . . . you know, we could probably still do business.”); Telephone Interview with 
C-B (July 14, 2017) (“I wish they would have been more [communicative] and reached out to 
me.”); Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 8, 2017) (“They could have notified me ahead of 
time. That would have helped, because it came out of the blue.”);  
 138. Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 11, 2017). 
 139. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“[I]n general in those situations 
[where debtors have given a false view of the financial wherewithal of the company], creditors 
feel jilted and usually there’s a trust relationship that’s been built up many times with trade 
creditors over the years so in those cases there’s a very sour feeling.”).  
 140. See Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (“[A]nother point we always try 
to make is, we really feel badly about the accrued payable. There’s nothing we can do about 
that now . . . .”).  
 141. See Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017). 
 142. See Jonathan D. Hibbard, Nirmalya Kumar & Louis W. Stern, Examining the Impact 
of Destructive Acts in Marketing Channel Relationships, J. MKTG. RES., Feb. 2001, at 45, 54. 
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debtor had made clear that the bankruptcy filing was a consequence of a third 
party’s actions, such as the bank pulling a loan or an essential account of the 
debtor going unpaid.143 In other scenarios, the debtor’s industry could make 
a difference, like where creditors within the industry were generally aware of 
financial pressures that could lead a party to file and were thus more 
sympathetic.144 As eloquently expressed by one creditor, “[W]hen you don’t 
have no money, you don’t have no money.”145 
However, if creditors were sympathetic in cases where the debtor seemed 
to be a victim of its circumstances, they tended to be highly unsympathetic 
when the bankruptcy appeared to be deliberate and strategic. As one creditor 
reported, the owner of the creditor and the principal of the debtor had 
maintained a personal relationship prior to the bankruptcy.146 The debtor 
made reassurances to the creditor in the days leading up to bankruptcy, but it 
then cut off all communication upon filing.147 As a consequence, the creditor 
“was very angry. . . . [H]e felt like [the debtor] had lied to him and kind of 
just strung him along . . . . [H]e felt definitely betrayed.”148 Moreover, the 
creditor asserted that moving forward, “the owner here wouldn’t service 
anything of [the debtor’s] even if he came begging us.”149 Other creditors 
echoed the sentiment that, once a debtor had lost their trust, the debtor had 
also lost any hope of doing business going forward.150  
Beyond honest communication prior to and during the bankruptcy, 
interviewees also suggested that the amount of payout within the bankruptcy 
could have an effect on creditors’ decisions to cooperate with debtors, and 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017) (describing explanation for 
debtor’s financial woes indicated debtor had good intentions but no cash, prompting creditor 
to extend them credit quickly); Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (referencing 
instance where bank pulled the debtor’s line). 
 144. See Telephone Interview with C-JO (June 6, 2017) (e.g., oil and gas).  
 145. Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017).  
 146. Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-JC 
(June 6, 2017) (“If they can’t stay true to their word and their promise that they said that they 
were going to pay us, then there is a character flaw there. So, we don’t care to do business 
with that.”); see also Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (“[S]ometimes if you feel 
like the guy hasn’t been honest or truthful with you, it may not matter how much. There’s no 
way you’re doing business with them again.”). In some cases, the reason for the loss of trust 
was unknowable. One debtor’s principal reported that he had lost a “very, very close 
relationship” with a creditor because “it just became totally personal,” even despite the 
debtor’s efforts to communicate “almost daily.” Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017). 
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many connected the willingness to pay with perceptions of honesty and being 
true to one’s word. As one creditor observed, if a debtor voluntarily repaid 
its discharged debt following a bankruptcy proceeding, this would be an 
expression of honesty and trustworthiness, and “I would instantly give them 
credit. No problem at all.”151 Beyond what the plan payment had to say about 
trust and commitment, however, interviewees did not agree on whether the 
amount repaid had an independent influence on cooperation.152  
3. Influence of Pre-existing Relationship Commitment 
In addition to referencing specific acts demonstrating trustworthiness or 
betrayal, interviewees frequently pointed to perceptions regarding the pre-
existing relationship or ongoing relationship commitment as a deciding 
factor in how to respond to a debtor’s bankruptcy. These references were 
again consistent with prior research, which has observed that “efforts at 
nurturing trust and commitment with dealers builds a reservoir of goodwill 
on which the supplier can draw in the face of perceived destructive events.”153 
Creditors indicated that the previous length and quality of the relationship 
would be a factor in a decision to continue the relationship following a 
bankruptcy.154 As expressed by one creditor, 
[The decision to continue a relationship after bankruptcy is] not 
necessarily credit collection’s decision . . . sometimes it’s the 
decision of our sales people that are involved. How they view the 
relationship as a group, we talk about the ability of the company 
to actually come out of the bankruptcy. Whether or not it’s a 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017). 
 152. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) (“[I]f the payout is small, they may 
be hesitant to deal with the debtor going forward, because they don’t want to get burned 
again.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (indicating that in cases where 
unsecured creditors attempt to undermine the reorganization, the motivation may be in the 
payout but, even more so, may be “what led up to the filing, how they contested litigation or 
things like that”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (observing that in one case 
creditors receiving a 15% payout over several years were notably cooperative “because they 
want the company to succeed”). In one of the surveyed cases, the debtor did manage to pay 
all unsecured credit in full, and creditors reported being very satisfied with the outcome, as 
well as continuing their relationship with the debtor. Telephone Interview with PC (May 18, 
2017); see also Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017).  
 153. Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, supra note 143, at 57.  
 154. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017). 
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relationship we’d like to continue, if we see some benefit in 
it . . . .155  
Thus, the quality of the relationships in the past directly influenced the 
perceived ongoing value of the relationship.156 At least one debtor noted that 
creditors were more likely to be cooperative if there was a “human” rather 
than a “corporate” relationship between the two companies and that a lack of 
such a relationship “has dramatically harmed us.”157  
In some cases, the strength of the relationship commitment, at least on the 
creditors’ side, might have arisen less from positive past experiences and 
more from the size or importance of the debtor. Often, creditors would 
explain their ongoing relationship with a debtor by pointing to the lack of 
alternative business in the area.158 As one creditor put it, “there’s not a lot of 
forty[-]store chains out here bouncing around that we can go get their 
business.”159 Others reflected similar sentiments.160 
A second narrative that arose—somewhat unexpectedly—from the 
interviews demonstrated that, just as relationships could be damaged beyond 
repair by a debtor’s perceived betrayal, so relationships could be ended based 
on the debtor’s loss of trust in a creditor. Several interviewees referenced 
situations where the debtor, while generally attempting to preserve 
relationships, might elect not to continue doing business with particular 
creditors because of their actions during the bankruptcy proceedings. In one 
case, the debtor observed that two of its most essential trade creditors had 
joined a creditor’s committee and then insisted on being critical vendors, 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017).  
 156. See Telephone Interview with C-JO (June 6, 2017) (“This sounds terrible, but part of 
it probably depends on the type of customer they had been up to the bankruptcy.”); see also 
Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (noting that trade creditor reaction to bankruptcy 
will largely depend on the history between the trade creditor and debtor).  
 157. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with DA 
(May 25, 2017) (observing that close business relationships can be very helpful to a debtor in 
bankruptcy).  
 158. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017). 
 159. Id. (observing that even though debtor was always a late payer, they “had to suck it 
up and appreciate their business and continue servicing their stores”).  
 160. Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017) (“[I]f they’re a massive chain . . . we still 
service [them].”); see also Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017); Telephone 
Interview with D (June 2, 2017) (“[T]hey stayed with us for two reasons: [1] relationships, I 
mean if we didn’t have the relationship with the vendor, they wouldn’t have stayed[,] . . . [2] 
they need us on a go-forward basis as much as we need them, if not more.”); Telephone 
Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (noting that relationship commitment post-bankruptcy 
depends on how important the debtor is as a customer).  
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charging a premium on goods and services going forward and demanding 
payment on a cash-only basis. The debtor responded, somewhat indignantly, 
by finding new vendors.161 In other cases, a creditor’s decision regarding 
whether to join a creditor committee was itself viewed as a possible betrayal, 
insofar as it meant taking an adversarial stance against the debtor.162 
IV. Preferences 
When interviewees described a general willingness of trade creditors to 
cooperate with debtors post-filing, they frequently introduced an unprompted 
caveat concerning debtors that filed preference actions against creditors. As 
one debtor’s counsel put it, “that’d be a point where [trade creditors] would 
draw a line.”163 Although relatively common within bankruptcy proceedings 
generally,164 preference actions are notorious for being poorly understood by 
the population at large, including businessmen and creditors. This is true even 
among those who are generally informed regarding bankruptcy laws. 
Accordingly, individuals and companies who find themselves on the wrong 
end of preference liability are, more often than not, shocked and outraged at 
the prospect of owing money back to the debtor’s estate on account of 
otherwise legal collection activity.165 As reported by the attorneys I 
interviewed, it was not uncommon for business people to express a sense of 
disbelief that avoidance actions pursuant to preference liability are the law of 
the land, describing preference law as unfair, outrageous, and even “un-
American.”166  
  
                                                                                                                 
 161. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017) (“That’s not [being] a critical vendor, 
that’s being a thief . . . .”). 
 162. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017) (noting that the debtor was not 
happy with the creditor’s affiliation with the committee because “they thought that I was suing 
them too”); Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017) (noting that cooperative trade creditors 
were actively recruited to sit on the creditor’s committee, but made a point of asking the 
debtor’s advice first, and then typically electing not to sit on the committee); Telephone 
Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (noting that creditors avoid sitting on the creditor’s 
committee because they do not want to be viewed as the enemy of the debtor).  
 163. Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017).  
 164. See TABB, supra note 78, at 488.  
 165. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017). 
 166. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“One of the hardest things for a 
practicing attorney to explain is to the creditor who gets a preference demand letter. And it’s 
usually, ‘[W]hat kind of country is this? This is unconstitutional. This is un-American.’”).  
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A. Reactions to Preference Liability 
The perception of preference actions as a betrayal and destroyer of 
relationships was practically universal across interviewees. Preference 
actions were described as the height of betrayal, “a slap in the face,”167 
particularly insofar as they target creditors who “view themselves as trying 
to help during this time of distress” by continuing to extend credit.168 In one 
case, a preference action was brought against a creditor with a long-standing 
prior relationship with the debtor’s principal. In that scenario, the creditor 
indicated that the debtor “knew, well in advance that this was about to 
happen. And, [he] continued to do business as usual . . . .”169 In expressing 
his outrage and disbelief at the perceived betrayal, the creditor indicated, “I 
mean in all honesty, he better never turn the corner and see me.”170 As another 
creditor put it, “This is stealing. I don’t care what the regulations are saying, 
you can declare bankruptcy whenever and you can take money back from us? 
It’s still stealing from us.”171 
Not surprisingly, based on these reactions, interviewees frequently 
reported the expectation that a preference action would spell the end of the 
relationship between debtor and creditor, no matter the length of the 
relationship.172 As one debtor’s attorney opined, “I think if you file a 
preference action against [creditors], they get completely irrational. Now 
you’re trying to take something away that they already got, and that will 
make most of them livid and they will cease doing business with you.”173 As 
another explained, “a creditor can live with the idea that they’re not going to 
get paid on their debt. What they can’t live with, what is totally unacceptable 
and foreign, is the idea of giving the money back, and they haven’t been 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017). 
 172. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[T]he person who you’re 
collecting it from, they’re never going to do business with you again or sell you whatever 
they’re selling you.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“If there was a 
relationship there isn’t going to be afterwards.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 
2017) (“That’s usually . . . the thing that can put the creditor over the edge.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (“Well, no question, it affects [the relationship] 
negatively.”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (“They’re not going to want to do 
business with you. . . . It’s a disincentive to put it mildly.”); see also Telephone Interview with 
CA (May 18, 2017); Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with 
CA (May 30, 2017). 
 173. Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017).  
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paid.”174 Attorneys were so confident in their conclusions that a preference 
action would end a business relationship that they often reported advising 
their clients to avoid preference actions against any individual with whom 
they would like an ongoing relationship.175 Many creditors who had been 
subject to preference actions affirmed this perception, reporting that they 
ceased to do business with the company that sued them based on a lingering 
“sour taste” in the mouth, whether or not the preference suit was successfully 
defended.176  
However, this perspective was not universally shared, nor universally 
demonstrated among interviewees. One highly experienced creditors’ 
attorney opined that most creditors are too focused on sales going forward to 
get hung up on the insult of past preference actions.177 This opinion found 
support in reports of creditors who continued their relationship with a 
reorganized debtor, or more often, the purchaser of the debtor, even after a 
preference action had been prosecuted against them. The reasons creditors 
gave for continuing the relationship despite their keen sense of betrayal and 
frustration included the need to sell product and the desire to continue good 
relationships with principals of the debtor, who creditors often did not view 
as responsible for the preference action itself. As one creditor reported, it 
continued to do business with the reorganized debtor “because sometimes 
we’ll have a [product] that nobody else wants. . . . If we can sell it to 
somebody else, we definitely do.” 178 Another explained that they continued 
to do business with the reorganized debtor “only because I did trust the 
CEO,” and wanted to see a twenty-year project to completion.179 They added, 
“If I had not known the CEO ahead of time and if I had not dealt with him 
personally, and known of his character, [the preference action] would have 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017).  
 175. See discussion infra note 214.  
 176. See Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (“I do kind of have a little sour taste 
in my mouth about that. . . . I don’t know that I would be willing to do business with that 
company again.”); Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) (reporting that, after doing 
business with the debtor for 10-15 years prior, they gave up the relationship based on the 
amount lost in the preference claim); Telephone Interview with PC-L (Sept. 7, 2017) (“We 
have nothing to do with them whatsoever. . . . It left a nasty taste in everybody’s mouth.”); 
Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017) (“I wouldn’t touch that thing with a ten-foot-
pole, man. Are you kidding?”). 
 177. Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017). 
 178. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017).  
 179. Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 8, 2017).  
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left a very bitter taste in my mouth too.”180 As noted by one attorney, the 
ability of creditors to compartmentalize their frustration with preference 
actions and distinguish between the perceived betrayal of the debtor and the 
ongoing trustworthiness of the reorganized debtor may be influenced by the 
fact that most preference actions are brought by third parties, such as a 
liquidating trust or the creditor’s committee.181  
B. The Impact of Preference Actions on Trade Creditors and Its Influence 
on Trade Credit 
Discussions with interviewees indicated that preference actions impose a 
significant burden on creditors, particularly when creditors are less 
sophisticated and therefore less able to anticipate the loss and expense 
associated with a preference action. As one creditor operating a family 
business reported, the delay between the payment and the claw-back was 
highly problematic. “It’s not like you’ve just received money, and when you 
do receive money, you’ve already put out a whole lot in order to make the 
money and you have a lot of bills to pay . . . .”182 Particularly for smaller 
businesses, maintaining a consistent cash flow is a constant concern,183 
making unwelcome and unanticipated costs particularly burdensome. In 
summary, “it was really hard emotionally and it was hard financially on us 
to have to give that money back.”184 A further burden was often imposed by 
the perceived need to hire an attorney, which inevitably added to creditors’ 
expenses, although it often resulted in a more favorable outcome in the 
preference action.185  
Creditors, particularly those who encountered preference actions for the 
first time, tended to respond to the perceived increased risk for future 
preference actions by restricting their future credit. As one creditor 
explained, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 8, 2017) (reporting ongoing 
relationship with the same company based on relationship with the same CEO).  
 181. See discussion infra note 214; Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017).  
 182. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017). 
 183. See Email from Paul Schrader, Fullerton Law, to Brook E. Gotberg (Mar. 29, 2018, 
08:31 CST) (on file with author) (noting the importance of short run cash flow to creditors).  
 184. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017). 
 185. See Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 8, 2017) (settling for 5% of demand, but paid 
three times that amount in attorneys’ fees); Telephone Interview with PC-L (Sept. 7, 2017) 
(defending preference action after hiring an attorney); Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 
2017) (noting the expense of the preference action included thousands in attorneys’ fees). 
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Nobody’s ever owed me that much money again. . . . I’ve got 
customers that I’ve done business with for years, same kind of 
situation, and basically, I’d let them get maybe [thirty to ninety] 
days out on me. Don’t do it no more. You just lock them into 
[thirty] days, and if they don’t you cut them off. It’s just not worth 
the risk. . . . [I]t makes you tighten up all of your financial aid to 
people, which makes it hard for these other businesses because 
you won’t extend them as much credit. But you just can’t afford 
to take these risks anymore. You can’t extend credit to guys 
anymore. . . . [M]ost everybody is on a cash basis: you want it, 
you pay me and you get it. 186  
Others echoed this approach, reporting that they had tightened their credit 
terms for all customers after the preference action.187  
C. Strategic Preference Actions 
Attorneys, both on the debtor and the creditor side, largely recognized 
preference actions as strategic tools and referenced decisions to bring 
preference actions selectively. Both debtors and debtors’ counsel reported 
acknowledging the harm that preference actions can cause to debtor/creditor 
relationships, and they accordingly expressed reluctance to bring preference 
actions unless absolutely necessary or strategically desirable. Most attorneys 
agreed that preference actions could be brought or abandoned pursuant to the 
debtor’s strategic needs. 
Accordingly, attorneys who represented debtors frequently reported that 
they would not pursue preference actions that were likely to permanently 
terminate important business relationships.188 Citing the “unwritten rules of 
a preference action,” one attorney put it bluntly: “[W]here a debtor 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017). 
 187. See Telephone Interview with PC-B (Sept. 7, 2017) (“[W]e’re more risk-averse [now] 
than we were, so that means companies that need help don’t get as much of our expertise.”); 
Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 14, 2017). This reaction is consistent with that observed in 
other studies. See Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, supra note 143, at 54 (observing that perceived 
acts of betrayal lead to disengagement). For an interesting analysis of a study on practice 
reciprocity, or how players in a strategy game respond to acts of defection or cooperation, see 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118-20 (1984).  
 188. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (“[W]hat is the impact of me suing 
this trade creditor going to have on my business?”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 
2017) (“If you are on the debtor’s side you never want to file [preference actions] unless you 
hate the creditor that you’re filing against. I mean, because it’s not good business.”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (“I can’t recall, sitting here, an instance where 
we filed a preference claim against a post-petition vendor.”). 
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reorganizes and continues to do business with the vendor, that vendor is not 
going to get sued for a preference.”189 Counsel also pointed to the probable 
negative consequences for the debtor’s reputation as a reason not to pursue 
preference actions.190 The overall result was that preference actions tended 
not to be brought in a reorganization where the business would continue as a 
going concern.191  
 Not all attorneys agreed with the view that preference actions are 
permissive rather than mandatory. Two of the seventeen interviewed 
expressed the opinion that the debtor would be required to make a demand 
for an available preference, even if the debtor did not wish to do so out of 
concern for the potential impact on the debtor’s relationship. They cited the 
fact that, in bankruptcy, the DIP becomes a fiduciary to its creditors, who in 
turn become the residual owners of the business in the way that shareholders 
are in solvent companies.192 In addition, they pointed to concerns that, should 
the DIP not pursue obvious preferences, the creditors could make a stronger 
case for appointing a trustee over the estate who would pursue the 
preferences.193 Other creditors appeared to acknowledge this second concern, 
but they suggested that such pressure rarely comes into play following plan 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017). 
 190. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (“[Y]eah I’ve got preferences, but 
I don’t intend to assert them because I think the cost of doing business and the reputation[] 
loss . . . is not worth the effort.”); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (noting that 
it is a balancing act to decide whether recovery of the preference amount is worth the cost to 
the relationship).  
 191. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[I]f you’re working with a client 
and he’s selling you something that you need and you have a good relationship with him, 
you’re not going to sue him . . . . Especially if your plan’s been confirmed. I just don’t see that 
happening much. But, you do see it a lot in the liquidation cases.”); Telephone Interview with 
DA (May 25, 2017) (“[T]ypically, in a true reorganization as opposed to a sale case or a 
liquidation . . . [a] true reorganization you normally give up, waive, any right to bring 
preference actions as part-and-parcel of your confirmation process.”); Telephone Interview 
with CA (May 30, 2017) (“[A]n ongoing Chapter 11 debtor that needs the relationship [is] not 
going to pursue the preference action against a party that is needed for the business . . . .”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (“Is it a liquidation or a reorganization? 
Because, there is more likely to be a preference action[] actually pursued in a liquidation. 
Because, otherwise the creditor relationships are more important in a reorganization.”). 
 192. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“I think you have to. I don’t think 
you’re doing your job if you don’t. . . . [Y]our debtor’s a fiduciary, they got to do what’s 
right.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“You really can’t do that, when you’re 
representing a chapter 11 debtor. You’re a fiduciary of the debtor in possession.”).  
 193. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (allowing the court may order the appointment of a 
trustee on request of a party “if such appointment is in the interests of the creditors”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017).  
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confirmation, which is when a preference action is most likely to be 
brought.194 Attorneys also noted that the presence or absence of possible 
defenses would weigh into the calculation of whether to file a preference 
action,195 although demands made through an informal letter campaign might 
be made at the drop of a hat.196 It appears unsettled whether a debtor has a 
legal duty to bring available preference actions; nevertheless, the issue raises 
interesting questions about the extent to which a debtor’s fiduciary duties in 
a reorganization involve engaging in potentially self-destructive actions.  
For most attorneys, however, preference actions were desirable only in 
cases where the targeted creditor was no longer important to the debtor or the 
preference action was otherwise viewed as strategically necessary. 197 Several 
attorneys did acknowledge bringing a preference action as a strategic defense 
to encourage the reduction of a creditor’s claim against the estate.198 In these 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017). Some reported cases have 
indicated that creditors may force a preference action, or obtain standing to bring a preference 
action, in scenarios where the debtor has failed to do so. See, e.g., Canadian Pac. Forest Prods. 
Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson), 66 F. 3d 1436, 1438 (6th Cir. 1995) (permitting a single 
creditor to initiate an action to avoid a preferential transfers if the creditor has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success, and a demand on the debtor to bring the action has been unjustifiably 
refused). The court in In re Gibson specifically cited to concerns that the debtor would use 
preference actions “as a sword to favor certain creditors over others,” noting that “we do not 
believe Congress intended to exclude creditors from seeking to avoid preferential or fraudulent 
transfers where the debtor-in-possession [so] abuses its discretion.” Id. at 1441.  
 195. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). For an explanation of these exceptions, see Gotberg, supra 
note 5, at 67-77.  
 196. This observation was even more accurate outside the chapter 11 context, particularly 
for chapter 7 trustees. See supra note 21; Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); 
Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) 
(“[Y]ou’re going to send at least a demand to see if he can shake the trees and get money out 
of them.”); Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (“Mostly people look at preferences 
like, let me try and shake the tree to see if I can get some extra money.”).  
 197. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“I mean it’s only a good idea if 
you really need the money. But, if you’re going to get your plan confirmed and it’s financed 
then it’s been confirmed, there isn’t a great need for the preference recovery, unless you just 
have to collect some money. And so, it almost doesn’t pay to do it.”); Telephone Interview 
with CA (May 25, 2017) (noting the filing of preference claims when “the principal didn’t 
really care about the creditor anymore, didn’t need the creditor’s support”); Telephone 
Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“[I]f you want to have a good supply relationship with 
your vendors, or if you want the gardener to mow your lawn, you’re not going to be suing 
them. Or, if you do it, you file a lawsuit as a cover for you doing your fiduciary duty, but 
‘wink’ let’s do a deal whereby, you know, that’s favorable.”).  
 198. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (detailing preference action that 
was brought to reduce size of claim); Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017) (reporting 
that preference action was brought against a particular creditor because “[t]hey became 
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cases, the loss of the business relationship was acknowledged as a foregone 
conclusion because it was usually viewed as beyond saving.199 Other 
strategic uses for preference actions included bringing the suit in order to 
exclude the creditor’s claim so that the targeted creditor would be ineligible 
to vote on the plan of reorganization.200 
Another interesting point regarding the use of preference actions in 
reorganization cases was the frequently-raised issue of timing. A preference 
action may be brought up to two years after the bankruptcy filing,201and 
potentially longer if a trustee is appointed or the case is subsequently 
converted to a chapter 7 proceeding. Accordingly, a creditor can be subject 
to a demand for repayment of a preference after it has already agreed to a 
plan of reorganization and accepted a reduced payout plan for its remaining 
debt.202 Depending on the case, the plan of reorganization may have already 
been confirmed.203 
                                                                                                                 
exceptionally, outrageously aggressive, trying to create things that didn’t exist”); Telephone 
Interview with D (June 22, 2017) (explaining that preference action was used “to try to 
ascertain and force somebody to make a decision or negotiate for the sake of the company so 
that we’re not stuck in a legal battle forever, trying to figure out who has first right to anything 
and to be able to function”). 
 199. See Telephone Interview with D (June 22,2017). 
 200. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017). It was unclear on what basis 
bringing the preference action would disqualify a given creditor. A pending cause of action 
against a creditor could make the creditor ineligible to serve by virtue of a conflict of interest. 
See In re First Republic Bank Corp.,95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998). Alternatively, if 
the creditor’s claim is disallowed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) for failure to turnover 
property subject to a preference action, the creditor may not be permitted to serve on the 
committee.  
 201. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2018).  
 202. See id. As one interviewee pointed out, preference actions may even be made against 
individuals who were not creditors at the time the chapter 11 plan was voted on and confirmed, 
but who subsequently become creditors, bound by the plan, when the debtor brings a 
preference action against them. Such a result has the effect of disenfranchising creditors and 
it raises questions regarding whether preference actions should only be allowed prior to plan 
confirmation. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“I think there’s a fair 
argument to be made that preference and other avoidance actions must be brought[,] if at all, 
pre-confirmation.”).  
 203. There is no stated timeframe in which a plan must be confirmed, although a court may 
allow other parties to propose a plan if the debtor has not successfully confirmed a plan within 
a given time frame. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121. For most cases, preference actions will still be 
available after plan confirmation. See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned 
Cases, and Refiling Rates: An Empirical Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 571, 582-83 (2015) (finding a duration mean of 430 days between filing and 
confirmation of plans for companies in traditional chapter 11 cases after 2005).  
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Attorneys seemed particularly attuned to this discrepancy, and they noted 
the strategic advantage of waiting to file a preference action until after the 
plan had been confirmed, in large part, because the debtor would no longer 
require the targeted creditor’s vote in favor of confirmation.204 For at least 
one creditor, the strategy was somewhat effective.205 In addition, attorneys 
noted that preference actions may be a bargaining chip with a creditor’s 
committee, which may be for or against the pursuit of such actions in any 
given case, and preferences may be explicitly dealt with in the plan.206 One 
attorney also suggested that the delay can help the debtor because the creditor 
will have already made the choice to continue doing business with the 
company.207 When the company commences timely payment in bankruptcy, 
this encourages further continuation of business despite a subsequent 
preference action.208 
More commonly, interviewees reported that companies in reorganization 
would decline to bring preference actions at all, instead assigning such 
actions to a separate trust or to the creditor’s committee itself.209 In doing so, 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[A] lot of times, people wait until 
after the plan is confirmed and then sometimes they’ll pursue those actions and sometimes 
not.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“[I]f it’s in a chapter 11 you typically 
try to avoid doing those [preference actions] until after the plan’s confirmed or something. 
Because if you do that during the pendency of the case you’re going to not have a very happy 
creditor. They’re not going to be too terribly supportive of your reorganization efforts.”). This 
activity has been taken to some extremes, as in the case of In re DPH Holdings Corp., in which 
the debtor requested, and was granted, leave to file preference complaints under seal prior to 
obtaining confirmation. Filing of the complaints was necessary to toll the statute of limitations, 
but the debtor argued successfully before the court that the actions should be kept secret so as 
to not affect the vote. See Jeffrey A. Wurst & Michael T. Rozea, Secret Extensions – 
Preference Actions Avoiding the Statute of Limitations, ABF J. (March 2011) at 
https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/secret-extensions-preference-actions-avoiding-the-
statute-of-limitations/. 
 205. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017) (“[W]e didn’t know about the 
preference until two years after they declared bankruptcy.”). 
 206. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (“[W]e’ve seen a trend a little bit 
in some retail cases where a negotiated resolution with the creditor’s committee may be that 
the debtor agrees not to file preference cases. So, it’s a negotiating tool, and usually you wait 
until the end unless there’s a significant preference issue that you need to file early in the 
case.”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (explaining situation in which creditor’s 
committee obtained the right to preferential transfers from a liquidating trust, but only “against 
vendors that were no longer deemed critical”).  
 207. Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017). 
 208. See id. 
 209. This approach has been upheld as lawful. See, e.g., Commodore Int’l Ltd. v. Gould 
(In re Commodore Int’l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a creditors’ 
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the debtor could assert plausible deniability in the face of creditor outrage.210 
One attorney explained that, particularly in recent years, the model has 
shifted from a true organization to a sale of the business and the establishment 
of a liquidating trust.211 As a consequence, the debtor need not concern itself 
with the ongoing business relationships; instead, these relationships become 
the concern of the purchaser of the debtor’s assets.212 Attorneys 
overwhelmingly reported that buyers of assets as a going concern were 
concerned with the impact preference actions had on business relationships. 
Often, attorneys advised buyers to purchase any preference claims as part of 
the agreement and then abandon those claims to avoid disruption to necessary 
business relationships.213 As one attorney put it, “if I represent a buyer [then] 
I’ll buy the preference claims too if I can[,] [b]ecause I can just cancel. If I 
buy the business, then I will buy the preference claims so that I don’t have 
some bankruptcy estate suing my suppliers.” 214 
In summary, debtors and their representatives generally acknowledged 
that preference actions harm debtor efforts to reorganize and are accordingly 
avoided if at all possible. When they are pursued, it is because the targeted 
creditor is no longer deemed essential to the debtor’s reorganization efforts, 
                                                                                                                 
committee may acquire standing to pursue the debtor’s claims with consent of the DIP or the 
trustee, when the suit is in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate and “necessary and 
beneficial” to the fair and efficient resolution of the case). 
 210. See id. (“[W]e tried very hard to peel off the preference actions into a trust for the 
benefit of creditors. So, that when the company reorganized and the trustee went and did those 
preference actions and the creditors screamed, we as counsel to the reorganized debtor could 
say, ‘That’s not us.’”).  
 211. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (“[T]his isn’t the older days where 
we actually had . . . to worry about those kinds of continued relationship issues. It’s just 
different. [Debtors don’t worry about a continuing relationship] because they’re not going to 
be the debtor, typically. I mean, almost every case ends up in a [§]363 sale.”); see also Douglas 
G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 73 (2004); Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2004).  
 212. Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (“[S]o then it’s really the new buyer 
that has to worry about how the outstanding preferences are going to impact its purchase.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“Sometimes the buyer will 
buy those litigation claims and not ever pursue them because the buyer doesn’t want a 
liquidating trustee to sue them because they’re suppliers now.”); Telephone Interview with 
CA (July 26, 2017) (“[W]e have seen in the sale of asset cases where buyers through their 
asset purchase agreements . . . then assum[e] the preference actions, essentially buying those 
actions from the bankruptcy estate, and out of the self-interest that they don’t want to[] sue 
future customers as part of their acquisition . . . .”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 
2017) (“The buyer, I think the vast majority of the time, negotiates to protect vendors that they 
will continue to do business with.”). 
 214. Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017).  
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or because the strategic advantage of the preference outweighs its perceived 
harm. Furthermore, when actions are brought, DIPs take pains to transfer 
them to third parties to prosecute in order to absolve themselves of 
responsibility in the eyes of creditors. These findings speak to how 
preference avoidance actions are actually viewed and used in chapter 11 and 
why.  
V. Relational Preferences 
The reported use of preference actions as a strategic measure to distinguish 
between favored and less-favored creditors is shocking when preferences are 
understood as an effort to promote the equal treatment of creditors. However, 
this use is predictable when preference actions are seen as yet another tool 
provided to a chapter 11 debtor to promote its own reorganization. If 
bankruptcy in chapter 11 is about business preservation, the use or non-use 
of preference actions on the basis of relationship status is both reasonable 
and expected. 
In light of what we know about business relationships and their response 
to perceived acts of betrayal, it should not be surprising that companies in 
bankruptcy hesitate to bring preference actions against valuable trade 
partners, and that they can justify that hesitation as being in the best interests 
of the company. As Steward Macaulay observed in his seminal work on the 
topic, there is a strong culture in business to avoid legal recourse when at all 
possible.215 Macaulay reported one businessman as saying, “You can settle 
any dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do 
not understand the give-and-take needed in business.”216 The businessmen in 
Macaulay’s study were so reluctant to exercise their rights against business 
partners that they would forgo legal remedies to which they were entitled.217 
This was explained in part by the perception that reliance on such recovery 
was unnecessary in light of prevailing non-legal norms and sanctions and that 
use of legal remedies could backfire. As Macaulay noted, “[b]oth business 
units involved in the exchange desire to continue successfully in business and 
will avoid conduct which might interfere with attaining this goal. One is 
concerned with both the reaction of the other party in the particular exchange 
and with his own general business reputation.”218 The power of reputation, 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, AM. 
SOC. REV., Feb. 1963, at 55, 58. 
 216. Id. at 61. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. at 63.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1058 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1013 
 
 
Macaulay found, operates very effectively to encourage cooperative 
behavior, both in keeping commitments and in avoiding the impression that 
one is “inflexible” or too insistent on adhering to precise business terms.219 
Businesses may lose future customers by developing a reputation for 
unreliability or litigiousness.220 In light of chapter 11’s focus on business 
reorganization, concerns relative to the business’s position and reputation 
vis-à-vis its partners is natural. 
Furthermore, similar concerns about relationship preservation in 
bankruptcy arise in other chapter 11 contexts. For example, the pressure to 
retain business relationships with essential trade creditors, combined with the 
pressure to mollify these creditors with a credible promise of repayment, has 
justified the practice of granting so-called “critical vendor” motions in some 
circumstances.221 The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “critical 
vendor” nor does it provide any explicit guidance on what action may be 
taken to preserve a DIP’s relationship with such a creditor. Instead, decisions 
about who to submit to the court as a critical vendor are left to the debtor, 
with the court typically granting or denying designation on a case-by-case 
basis.222 The factors courts consider will vary, but they will typically involve 
some evaluation of how necessary a given creditor is and how unlikely it is 
that the creditor will continue to do business with the DIP absent such a 
designation.223 For creditors who are designated as critical vendors, the DIP 
generally moves for the court to permit payment of certain pre-bankruptcy 
claims prior to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.224 Courts across 
the country have granted such motions, often pursuant to bankruptcy courts’ 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 64, 66 (“Holding a customer to the letter of a contract is bad for ‘customer 
relations.’”).  
 220. See id. at 61 (quoting one businessman as saying, “if something comes up, you get 
the other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don’t read legalistic contract 
clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he 
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently”). 
 221. See Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor 
Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 183 (2005). 
 222. Id. at 184. 
 223. See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 498-99 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) 
(requiring debtor to demonstrate (1) vendor is “virtually indispensable to profitable operations 
or preservation of the estate”; (2) designation would realize “meaningful economic gain” or 
avoidance of “serious economic harm”; and (3) there is a lack of “practical alternatives”); In 
re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (considering 
“[w]hether approval of the borrowing is critical to the future of the business, given the 
condition of the business at the time the motion is heard, and given the status of its post-
petition financing”).  
 224. See Resnick, supra note 221, at 183.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/3
2019]       RELATIONAL PREFERENCES IN CHAPTER 11 1059 
 
 
ability under § 105 of the Code to “issue any order, process, or judgment that 
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”225 
Critical vendor motions are a topic of controversy within the bankruptcy 
field, both in their statutory justification and in their practical 
consequences.226 As such, scholars have paid significant attention to the 
legitimacy of their use and the extent to which they impact bankruptcy 
proceedings.227 However, until now scholars have not viewed preference 
litigation in a similar vein. As demonstrated above, preference actions can be 
seen as a counterpoint to critical vendor motions—the stick counterpart to 
the critical vendor carrot. Instead of providing an incentive to companies on 
the front end of a bankruptcy to continue their interactions with the debtor, it 
may be a punishment on the back end. Companies that are not essential, that 
resist the debtor’s efforts to reorganize, or that might grant other strategic 
concessions may be subject to a preference action while others are spared. In 
this way, the motivation and use of preference actions in chapter 11 are 
analogous to critical vendor motions, and stem from concerns of debtor 
survival more than creditor equality or pre-bankruptcy behavior.  
Conclusion 
On the whole, the data gathered from this limited study of parties involved 
in bankruptcy proceedings suggests that preference law in chapter 11 is not 
used for the purpose of ensuring equality among creditors. Indeed, preference 
                                                                                                                 
 225. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018).  
 226. See, e.g., Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate 
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 414 (2003) (referring to the practice 
of granting critical vendor motions as “unjust, unwise, and illegal”); Robert A. Morris, The 
Case Against “Critical Vendor” Motions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003, 
https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/the-case-against-critical-vendor-motions (“For the same 
reasons that cause the debtor to have no short-term substitute for the critical supplier, that 
same supplier normally has no short-term substitute customer for that inventory and that 
production capacity.”).  
 227. See, e.g., Ashley M. McDow & Michael T. Delaney, Critical Vendors – Necessity or 
Nullity, 33 CAL. BANKR. J. 25, 25 (2014) (noting debate over the extent to which critical vendor 
claims should be permissible under the Bankruptcy Code); Resnick, supra note 221, at 212 
(“[B]ankruptcy courts should, and likely will, continue the practice of authorizing the payment 
of prebankruptcy debt in certain situations.”); Elizabeth Shumejda, Critical Vendor Trade 
Agreements in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 159, 193 (2016) (noting 
in a study of chapter 11 cases that nearly three-quarters of the sample had approved critical 
vendor motions); Travis N. Turner, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look and Critical 
Vendor Orders and the Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 482 (2006) 
(noting the lack of explicit statutory authorization for critical vendor motions, but suggesting 
some sources for authority). 
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law is instrumental in ensuring that creditors are not treated equally. Instead, 
preference actions are used as a strategic tool of the debtor to punish 
recalcitrant creditors, to coerce greater cooperation on the threat of a lawsuit, 
or to obtain funding for administrative expenses from creditors who will not 
be needed as business partners moving forward. Accordingly, this Article 
recommends a shift in how preference actions are viewed and discussed in 
the chapter 11 context. 
For one thing, it is illogical to view preference actions as serving creditors 
in chapter 11 proceedings. Rather, they serve the debtor’s interest as a DIP. 
Although additional data gathering is necessary, the perception is that 
preference actions do not actually recover much, especially when one takes 
the expense of litigation into account.228 One survey of practitioners 
estimated that the percentage of the claim settled for was, on average, 58.5% 
of the original amount identified as a preference.229 Many interviewees in this 
study reported observing significantly smaller recoveries in their practice, but 
there was a wide range of reported amounts, and the facts of the case 
mattered.230 Furthermore, the bar has expressed some skepticism that most 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See McCoid, supra note 43, at 262 (“There is little information regarding the extent 
of recapture. The Administrative Office of United States Courts, which annually published 
bankruptcy statistics, publishes no figures on this.”); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on 
H.R. 31, 32, Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary (pt. 1), 94th Cong. 396-97 (1975) (statement of Peter F. Coogan); id. at 479-80 
(testimony of Patrick A. Murphy); id. (pt. 3) at 1668-70 (1976) (statement of Richard 
Kaufman); James Angell McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 233, 235 (1946). The perception among credit providers as reported in a 1997 survey 
was that preferences recoveries “never or rarely” increased distributions to unsecured 
creditors, although the response from bankruptcy practitioners to the same question reported 
that recoveries were frequently significantly increased by preference recoveries. AM. BANKR. 
INST. TASK FORCE ON PREFERENCES, PREFERENCE SURVEY REPORT 5 (1997) (Charles J. Tabb, 
Reporter).  
 229. AM. BANKR. INST. TASK FORCE ON PREFERENCES, supra note 228, at 8; see also Email 
from Paul Schrader, Fullerton Law, to Brook E. Gotberg (Mar. 26, 2018, 5:14 PM CST) (on 
file with the author) (“The take of trustees and counsel from preference recoveries is often in 
the 20% – 40% range.”). 
 230. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (referencing choking a $25,000 
claim to $10,000); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“They always settle and they 
always settle for 40 to 60 cents [on the dollar].”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) 
(“In the practical scheme of things they’ll take fifty cents on the dollar back, sixty cents.”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (reporting settlements are 10-20% of what is 
owed); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (preference claims are settled for 20% 
or less of the face value); Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“As a rule of thumb 
[the settlement] should be less than 10%.”); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) 
(“The only thing I guess I would say with certainty is less than half. I’ve seen as low as 10% 
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preference recoveries go to administrative expenses, rather than to repay 
creditors.231 
As demonstrated above, preference proceedings in chapter 11 cases of 
reorganization are most likely motivated by a debtor’s strategic concerns, and 
not by the desire to ensure equal distribution among creditors. Accordingly, 
observers should not be surprised by creditors’ visceral negative reactions to 
the law of preferences. Insofar as preference actions serve a legitimate 
purpose in chapter 11 cases, it is to provide the debtor with the flexibility to 
manage its business relationships. As one attorney mused, “when all is said 
and done, the practice is at least as much about human relationships, trust and 
confidence, as it is about the technicalities of the Bankruptcy Code.”232 
Preference actions in chapter 11 represent a debtor’s ability to preserve or 
inflict harm on those relationships in order to obtain a desired end; that is, a 
successful plan of reorganization.  
  
                                                                                                                 
or less I suppose. It was rare that it was more than 50%.”); Telephone Interview with DA 
(Aug. 31, 2017) (reporting settlement amount ranges from 25-90% of the claimed amount); 
Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (reporting settlement payments of up to 75% on 
transfers with no defense, and up to 25% on transfers for which there is a good defense). 
 231. See, e.g., Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing Abusive Preference Actions: Rethinking 
Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, 
https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/curbing-abusive-preference-actions-rethinking-claims-on-
behalf-of-administratively. 
 232. Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017).  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: CREDITORS 
Last Revised 7/11/2017 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business? 
- What is the product or service that you produce? 
- How many employees? 
- Size in terms of revenues? 
- Number of offices? 
- Public or Private? 
- How long have you been in business in your current market? 
- What is your position? 
2. Can we talk a bit about your relationship with [the debtor] prior to 
the debtor’s bankruptcy? 
- How long have you done business with [the debtor]? 
- Who was your primary contact? 
- How did your relationship with [the debtor] begin? 
- What good or service did you provide to [the debtor]? OR what 
good or service did you receive from [the debtor]? 
 
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
1. Can you tell me what [the debtor’s] bankruptcy was like for you, or 
how it affected you or your business? 
 
- Were you surprised by [the debtor’s] decision to file for 
bankruptcy? 
- How did you find out that [the debtor] had filed for bankruptcy?  
- How did you feel about [the debtor] filing for bankruptcy? 
- What did you think that would mean for you and your company, if 
anything? 
- Was this your first bankruptcy experience? 
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4. Were you ever contacted by [the debtor’s] attorney? If so, can you 
tell me more about that experience? 
 
5. Did you ever have cause to hire your own attorney to represent you 
in [the debtor’s] bankruptcy proceedings? If so, why? 
 
- How did you feel about the need to involve an attorney? 
- Did you obtain an outcome you were satisfied with? 
- If not, what outcome would you have liked to see? 
If not, how did you negotiate the process? 
 
- Did anything surprise you about the bankruptcy? How did you react 
to that? 
POST-BANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCE 
 
6. After the bankruptcy was over, did your relationship with [the 
debtor] change? If so, why, and in what ways? 
 
- Did the bankruptcy affect the way you viewed [the debtor]? 
- Did the bankruptcy affect [the debtor’s] products or services? 
 
7. Do you still maintain a relationship with [the debtor]? 
 
- If so, why? If not, why not? 
- Was this your preferred outcome?  
- Would you have made the decision to maintain or not maintain the 
relationship if the bankruptcy had not happened? 
 
8. Reflecting on the experience as a whole, is there any way in which 
the court, the attorney, or [the debtor] could have acted differently to 
obtain a better overall outcome? 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: DEBTORS 
Last Revised 2/9/17 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business? 
 
- What is the product or service that you produce? 
- How many employees? 
- Size in terms of revenues? 
- Number of offices? 
- Public or Private? 
- How long have you been in business in your current market? 
 
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
2. What was it like to arrive at the decision to file bankruptcy? How 
did the decision come about? Did anything in particular influence your 
decision to file for bankruptcy? 
 
- What did you think bankruptcy would mean for you and your 
company? 
 
3. How did you make the decision to bring preference actions against 
your creditors? 
 
- What was the outcome of the preference action? 
- Was this the outcome you expected? 
- Were there any unexpected consequences? 
 
4. What was your overall experience with the bankruptcy process? 
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POST-BANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCE 
 
5. After the bankruptcy was over, did your business relationships with 
your pre-existing creditors (list specific creditors associated with 
debtor) change? If so, why, and in what ways? 
 
- Did the bankruptcy affect your ability to provide products or 
services? 
- Do you feel like the bankruptcy changed others’ perception of your 
business? 
- Did you lose any relationships with creditors? 
 
6. Were you happy with the outcome of your bankruptcy? 
 
7. Reflecting on the experience as a whole, is there any way in which 
the court, the attorneys, or anyone else could have acted differently to 
obtain a better overall outcome? 
 
- Was there anything about the process that surprised you? 
  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1066 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1013 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: ATTORNEYS 
Last Revised 7/19/2017 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business? 
 
- How long have you represented clients involved in bankruptcy? 
- How often have you been involved in bankruptcy cases? 
- Do you tend to represent more debtors or creditors, and what is the 
percentage? 
- What size of cases do you generally deal with? 
 
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
2. Generally speaking, what is the reaction of creditors when they learn 
that a business or trade partner has filed for bankruptcy? 
 
- From the debtor’s perspective, what would be the ideal reaction? 
- From the debtor’s perspective, what would the ideal relationship 
with creditor’s look like during the course of the bankruptcy? 
 
3. How does a bankruptcy filing actually influence the relationship 
between debtors and creditors? 
 
4. In your experience, how does the filing of a preference action affect 
the relationship between debtors and creditors? 
 
5. What considerations do debtors tend to weigh in determining 
whether or not to bring a preference action in a chapter 11? 
 
- Are there instances in which you had to counsel your client whether 
or not to bring a preference action? 
- What factors came into play in making that decision? 
- Were you surprised at all with the outcome of that decision? If so, 
how? 
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6. Do creditors ever see a preference action coming? 
 
- Are they deterred from collection on the debtor? 
 
7. How are preference actions typically resolved? 
 
- Based on your experience, what percentage of preference actions 
brought by the debtor, a liquidating trust, or the chapter 7 trustee 
result in settlement? Is there a difference depending on who brings 
the action?  
- For actions that settle, at what point in the proceedings does this 
tend to happen? 
- Based on your experience, what is the typical settlement as a 
percentage of the preference claim? Does it depend on certain 
factors, and if so, what?  
 
8. (For Debtor’s Attorneys) How often do you contact creditors? How 
do you perceive your role as counsel to a debtor? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
You are being contacted because of your company’s involvement in a recent 
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, ______. I am conducting a research study on the 
impact of chapter 11 on relationships between debtors and trade creditors. I hope 
you will consider being part of this research study.  
Within the next two weeks, I will attempt to contact you by telephone for an 
interview. The number I have for you is ______. I am attempting to interview 
approximately 15 debtors, 30 creditors, and 15 attorneys who can speak 
generally about their about their experience in chapter 11. I expect our discussion 
will take about 20 minutes, depending on the length of your responses. I will be 
recording the conversation for purposes of accurately capturing the information 
you provide. Your responses will be transcribed, but all information provided 
will be kept confidential, and your name and personal information will not be 
used in any way.  
You are under no obligation to participate in the research study, however, 
your participation will provide valuable insight into the experience of debtors 
and creditors in chapter 11, and how bankruptcy laws might be altered to better 
achieve the stated goals of bankruptcy. There are no known risks associated with 
participation, and no costs to you. As part of the research study, you will be asked 
to recall and describe your experience regarding bankruptcy proceedings that 
have taken place within the past five years. Depending on your experience, this 
may bring to mind stressful or unpleasant memories. There is no compensation 
associated with this study.  
Should you have any questions regarding this research study, or if you do 
not wish to be contacted, please fill out and return the attached form. You may 
also contact me at (573) 882-3914, or at my email address, 
gotbergb@missouri.edu. If you have questions regarding your rights as a 
subject participant, you may contact the Institutional Review Board for the 
University of Missouri at (573) 882-9585. In addition, if there is a number you 
would prefer to be contacted at, or a better organizational contact for this 
inquiry, please provide the information in the form below.  
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. 
 
Sincerely,  
Brook Gotberg 
Associate Professor 
University of Missouri School of Law 
203 Hulston Hall, Columbia, MO 65203 
(573) 882-3914 
gotbergb@missouri.edu 
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